The secret-sharing package

[maintain]
Warnings:

Implementation of an (m,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme. A given ByteString b (the secret) is split into n shares, and any m shares are sufficient to reconstruct b. The scheme preserves information-theoretic perfect secrecy in the sense that the knowledge of up to m-1 shares does not reveal any information about the secret b.

Example in GHCi: Suppose that you want to split the string "my secret data" into n=5 shares such that at least m=3 shares are necessary to reconstruct the secret.

> :m + Data.ByteString.Lazy.Char8 Crypto.SecretSharing
> let secret = pack "my secret data"
> shares <- encode 3 5 secret
> mapM_ (Prelude.putStrLn . show) shares
 (1,"\134\168\154\SUBV\248\CAN:\250y<\GS\EOT*\t\222_\140")
 (2,"\225\206\241\136\SUBse\199r\169\162\131D4\179P\210x")
 (3,"~\238%\192\174\206\\\f\214\173\162\148\&3\139_\183\193\235")
 (4,"Z\b0\188\DC2\f\247\f,\136\&6S\209\&5\n\FS,\223")
 (5,"x\EM\CAN\DELI*<\193q7d\192!/\183v\DC3T")
> let shares' = Prelude.drop 2 shares
> decode shares'
 "my secret message!"

The mathematics behind the secret sharing scheme is described in: "How to share a secret." by Adi Shamir. In Communications of the ACM 22 (11): 612–613, 1979.

Properties

Versions1.0.0.0, 1.0.0.0, 1.0.0.1, 1.0.0.2, 1.0.0.3
Dependenciesbase (==4.6.*), binary (>=0.5.1.1), bytestring (==0.10.*), dice-entropy-conduit (>=1.0.0.0), finite-field (>=0.8.0), polynomial (>=0.7.1), vector (>=0.10.11.0) [details]
LicenseLGPL-2.1
CopyrightPeter Robinson 2014
AuthorPeter Robinson <peter.robinson@monoid.at>
Maintainerpeter.robinson@monoid.at
Stabilityexperimental
CategoryCryptography
Home pagehttp://monoid.at/code
UploadedWed Sep 3 16:08:59 UTC 2014 by PeterRobinson

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