theory KEA_plus_eCK
begin

builtins: hashing, diffie-hellman

section{* KEA+ *}
/*
 * Protocol:	KEA+
 * Modeler: 	Cas Cremers
 * Date: 	January 2012
 * Source:	"Security Analysis of KEA Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol"
 * 		Lauter, Mityagin, 2006
 * Property: 	eCK security
 *
 * Status: 	working
 */

/* Protocol rules */

rule generate_ltk:
   [ Fr(~lk) ] 
   --[ RegKey($A) ]->
   [ !Ltk( $A, ~lk ), !Pk( $A, 'g'^~lk ), Out( 'g'^~lk ) ]

rule Init_1:
   [ Fr( ~ekI ), !Ltk( $I, ~lkI ) ]
   --[ SidI_1(~ekI,$I,$R, 'g'^~ekI ) ]->
   [ Init_1( ~ekI, $I, $R, ~lkI, 'g'^~ekI ),
     !Ephk(~ekI),
     Out( 'g'^~ekI ) ]

rule Init_2:
   [ Init_1( ~ekI, $I, $R, ~lkI , hkI), In( Y ), !Pk( $R,'g'^~lkR ) ]
   --[SidI_2( ~ekI, $I, $R, hkI, Y,
       h( <Y^~lkI, ('g'^~lkR)^~ekI, $I, $R > ) ) ]->
   [ !Sessk( ~ekI, 
       h( <Y^~lkI, ('g'^~lkR)^~ekI, $I, $R > ) ) ]


rule Resp_1:
   [ In( X ), Fr( ~ekR ), !Ltk($R, ~lkR), !Pk($I, 'g'^~lkI) ]
   --[ SidR_1( ~ekR, $I, $R, X, 'g'^~ekR ,
       h( <('g'^~lkI)^~ekR, X^~lkR, $I, $R > ) ) ]->
   [ Out( 'g'^~ekR ),
     !Ephk(~ekR),
     !Sessk( ~ekR, 
       h( <('g'^~lkI)^~ekR, X^~lkR, $I, $R > ) ) ]

/* Key Reveals for the eCK model */
rule Sessk_reveal: 
   [ !Sessk(~tid, k) ]
   --[ SesskRev(~tid) ]->
   [ Out(k) ]

rule Ltk_reveal:
   [ !Ltk($A, lkA) ]
   --[ LtkRev($A) ]->
   [ Out(lkA) ]

rule Ephk_reveal:
   [ !Ephk(~ekA) ]
   --[ EphkRev(~ekA) ]->
   [ Out(~ekA) ]


/* Security properties */

/*
lemma key_agreement_reachable:
  "not (Ex #i1 #i2 ekI ekR I R k hkI hkR.
          SidI_2(ekI, I, R, hkI, hkR, k) @ i1 & SidR_1(ekR, I, R, hkI, hkR, k) @ i2)"
*/

/* An attack is valid in eCK if the session key of the test session is deduced and
   the test session is clean.
*/
lemma eCK_initiator_key:
  " /* If every agent registered at most one public key */
    (All A #i #j. RegKey(A)@i & RegKey(A)@j ==> (#i = #j))
  ==>
    /* then there is not attack */
    (not(Ex #i1 #i2 ekI I R k hkI hkR.
            SidI_2(ekI, I, R, hkI, hkR, k) @ i1 & K( k ) @ i2

            /* Not both longterm-key-reveal _and_ ephemeral-key-reveal
	     * for test thread. */
            & not(Ex #i3 #i4. LtkRev( I ) @ i3 & EphkRev( ekI ) @ i4)

            /* No session-key-reveal of test thread. */
            & not(Ex #i3. SesskRev( ekI ) @ i3 )

            /* No session-key-reveal for matching session. */
            & not(Ex #i3 #i4 ekR kpartner.
                   SidR_1( ekR,I,R,hkI,hkR,kpartner ) @i3
		   & SesskRev( ekR ) @ i4 )

            /* Not both long-term-key-reveal and ephemeral-key-reveal
	     * for matching session */
            & not(Ex #i3 #i4 #i5 ekR kpartner.
                  SidR_1( ekR,I,R,hkI,hkR,kpartner ) @i3
		  & LtkRev( R ) @ i4
		  & EphkRev( ekR ) @ i5 )

	    /* Longterm-key-reveal of partner only if there is a
	     * matching session. */
	    /* (We model eCK-wpfs, for eCK-pfs, add i1 < i3 to conclusion) */
            & (All #i3. LtkRev( R ) @ i3 ==>
                  /* (i1 < i3) | */
	          (Ex #i4 ekR kpartner.
                      SidR_1( ekR,I,R,hkI,hkR,kpartner ) @i4))


    ) )"

/* An attack is valid in eCK if the session key of the test session is deduced and
   the test session is clean.
*/
lemma eCK_responder_key:
  " /* If every agent registered at most one public key */
    (All A #i #j. RegKey(A)@i & RegKey(A)@j ==> (#i = #j))
  ==>
    /* then there is not attack */
    (not (Ex #i1 #i2 ekR I R k hkI hkR.
            SidR_1(ekR, I, R, hkI, hkR, k) @ i1 & K( k ) @ i2

            /* Not longterm-key-reveal _and_ ephemeral-key-reveal of actor . */
            & not(Ex #i3 #i4. LtkRev( R ) @ i3 & EphkRev( ekR ) @ i4)

            /* Not session-key-reveal of test thread. */
            & not(Ex #i3. SesskRev( ekR ) @ i3 )

            /* Not session-key-reveal of partner thread. Note that we use SidI_2 here.
	       A session key reveal can only happen after SidI_2 is logged anyways.
	    */
            & not(Ex #i3 #i4 ekI kpartner.
                   SidI_2( ekI,I,R,hkI,hkR,kpartner ) @i3
		   & SesskRev( ekI ) @ i4 )

            /* If there is a partner thread, then not long-term-key-reveal and ephemeral-key-reveal. */
            & not(Ex #i3 #i4 #i5 ekI.
                  SidI_1( ekI,I,R,hkI ) @i3
		  & LtkRev( I ) @ i4
		  & EphkRev( ekI ) @ i5 )

	    /* If there is no partner thread, then there is no longterm-key-reveal for
	       the intended partner.
	       (We model eCK-wpfs, for eCK-pfs, add i1 < i3 to conclusion)
	       */
            & (All #i3. LtkRev( I ) @ i3 ==>
                  /* (i1 < i3) | */
	          (Ex #i4 ekI.
                       SidI_1( ekI,I,R,hkI ) @i4) )
    ) )"

end