# CPSA Design

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## Chapter 1

## Introduction

The Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer (CPSA) enumerates all essentially different executions possible for a cryptographic protocol. We call them the *shapes* of the protocol. Naturally occurring protocols have only finitely many, indeed very few shapes. Authentication and secrecy properties are easy to determine from them, as are attacks and anomalies.

The shapes analysis is performed within a pure Dolev-Yao model. The CPSA program reads a sequence of problem descriptions, and prints the steps it used to solve each problem. For each input problem, CPSA is given some initial behavior, and it descovers what shapes are compatible with it. Normally, the initial behavior is from the point of view of one participant. The analysis reveals what the other participants must have done, given the participant's view. The search is complete, i.e. every shape can in fact be found in a finite number of steps.

A CPSA release includes two other documents, The CPSA Specification and The CPSA Primer. The specification describes the CPSA algorithm in a form that is closely related to its implementation. Algorithm correctness proofs are given in the specification formalism.

There are many design decisions that are not reflected in The CPSA Specification. Including these decisions in the specification would clutter the document and unnecessarily complicate proofs. The purpose of this document is to describe the key omitted design decisions. It assumes the specification has been thoroughly read. Definitions are not reproduced, so the specification should be accessible when reading this document. The CPSA Primer provides an overview of CPSA, and may be worth reading before this document is approached.

### 1.1 Notation

Originally, the specification and the design were one and the same. Everything was specified in the design formalism. After the split, the description of protocols and preskeletons diverged by omitting details in the design formalism in what is used for the specification formalism. Appendix A in The CPSA Specification relates the two formalisms.

The key difference between the two formalisms is the design formalism more directly models the Haskell data structures used in the CPSA program. An instance of a Haskell data structure is modeled as an element in an order-sorted term algebra [3]. The reduction systems in the specification translate to term reduction systems in the design.

Zero-based indexing is used though out this document and in the source code it describes. Within the document, a finite sequence is a function from an initial segment of the natural numbers. Angle brackets are used for sequence construction and ^ is used for sequence concatenation. Thus

$$\langle 3, 2 \rangle \cap \langle 99 \rangle = \{0 \mapsto 3, 1 \mapsto 2, 2 \mapsto 99\}.$$

The length of a sequence S is |S|. The phrase "for  $x \in S$ " is shorthand for "for x in the range of S". The mapping of sequence S by function f is  $f \circ S$ . Some sets are represented by sequences with no duplicates, and f(S) is used for  $f \circ S$  after duplicates have been eliminated.

You might wonder why lowercase k is used for skeletons rather than black-board bold  $\mathbb{A}$ . The notation used in the design document is motivated by the code, and k with and without decoration somehow became associated with preskeletons, probably because p, r, t, and s, were already in use. Many other notational conventions are directly inspired by the code.

In this document, lowercase Latin letters usually stand for terms, and uppercase Latin letters stand for sequences or sets of terms.

### 1.2 Document Status

This version of the design describes the CPSA implementation that assumes the unification problem for the message algebra has one most general unifier. The Basic Crypto Algebra has this property.

## Chapter 2

## Messages

The formalism used in the design and the specification for message algebras is the same, an order-sorted term algebra. This chapter describes the relation between terms and the external syntax used by the CPSA program for the Basic Crypto Algebra, and then describes the interface between the algebra module and the rest of the program.

Table 2.1 presents a slightly modified signature for the Basic Crypto Algebra. It specifies a syntax for operations that follows mathematical tradition, such as writing  $K_A$  for  $\mathsf{pubk}(A)$ . Tag constants are quoted strings. The sort of all messages is mesg, the sort symbol used by the CPSA program. The sort  $\top$  is used in the specification so that the carrier set of all messages is  $\mathfrak{A}_{\top}$ , instead of  $\mathfrak{A}_{\text{mesg}}$ .

For pairing, parentheses are omitted when the context permits, and comma is right associative. Pairing was once called concatenation, hence the use of the symbol cat for pairing.

In the S-expression syntax used by the program, the simplest term is a variable, which syntactically is a SYMBOL as described in Appendix A. Internally, each variable has a sort, so the sort of each variable in the input must be declared in a vars form, such as:

The translation of S-expression terms is given in Table 2.2. Figure 3.2 on Page 13 contains examples of BCA message terms. Also see TERM in Table A.1, Appendix A.

The code that implements the Basic Crypto Algebra does not directly implement an order-sorted algebra. Instead, it implements a many-sorted

Base sort symbols: name, text, data, skey, akey Non-base sort symbol: mesg

Subsorts: name, text, data, akey, skey < mesg

 $\begin{array}{lll} \{ |\cdot| \}_{(\cdot)} \colon \operatorname{mesg} \times \operatorname{mesg} \to \operatorname{mesg} & \operatorname{Encryption} \\ (\cdot, \cdot) \colon \operatorname{mesg} \times \operatorname{mesg} \to \operatorname{mesg} & \operatorname{Pairing} \\ \text{``..."} \colon \operatorname{mesg} & \operatorname{Tag \ constants} \\ K_{(\cdot)} \colon \operatorname{name} \to \operatorname{akey} & \operatorname{Public \ key \ of \ name} \\ (\cdot)^{-1} \colon \operatorname{akey} \to \operatorname{akey} & \operatorname{Inverse \ of \ asymmetric \ key} \\ \operatorname{ltk} \colon \operatorname{name} \times \operatorname{name} \to \operatorname{skey} & \operatorname{Long \ term \ shared \ key} \\ \end{array}$ 

Axiom:  $(x^{-1})^{-1} \approx x$  for x: akey

Table 2.1: Basic Crypto Signature

Table 2.2: S-expression Terms

algebra and exports an order-sort algebra based on the implementation. Appendix B provides the complete details of the implementation.

### 2.1 Algebra Interface

The details of each implementation of a CPSA message algebra are hidden by an interface. This section presents the view of a term algebra exposed by the interface. Some aspects of the interface are omitted from this discussion. For example, each implementation of an algebra must provide a means to read a term from an S-expression, and write a term as an S-expression. Also omitted are functions in the interface that are specializations of a more general function added to enhance performance.

Each algebra provides a predicate to determine if a term is a variable, and another to determine if a term is an atom. A fresh variable generator is in the interface. Given a generator state and a term, it produces a clone of the term in which the variables have been replaced with freshly generated ones. It also returns the new generator state.

### 2.1.1 Equations

An algebra reports answers to unification and matching problems by returning an order-sorted substitution or an error indicator. A different data structure is used for each problem, in this document indicated by using  $\sigma$  for answers to the unification problem of  $\sigma(t_0) \equiv \sigma(t_1)$ , and using  $\sigma_E$  for answers to the matching problem of  $\sigma_E(t_0) \equiv t_1$ . As the typical case is for sets of equations to be solved, the unification and match functions have been designed to allow an incremental approach to solving the members of the set, by extending a substitution for one pair of equated terms. They have the following signatures:

unify: 
$$\mathcal{T}_{\top}(X) \times \mathcal{T}_{\top}(X) \times (X \to \mathcal{T}_{\top}(X)) \to (X \to \mathcal{T}_{\top}(X))^{?}$$
  
match:  $\mathcal{T}_{\top}(X) \times \mathcal{T}_{\top}(Y) \times (X \to \mathcal{T}_{\top}(Y)) \to (X \to \mathcal{T}_{\top}(Y))^{?}$ 

For type T, we write T? to describe the lifted type for T that includes an error indicator. In this formalism, sequences of length less than two are used for the lifted type, and the error indicator is the empty sequence. In Haskell, the lifted type is Maybe T.

An answer to the matching problem is called an *environment*. An environment differs from a substitution produced as an answer to a unification problem in that it may explicitly specify identity mappings, thus forbidding extensions to the environment that conflicts with these mappings. This distinction is crucial for correctly answering matching problems by iteratively extending an environment.

To support checks to see if terms are isomorphic via the match function, the algebra interface includes the *match variable renaming* predicate that tests an environment to see if it is a one-to-one variable-to-variable order sorted substitution.

To support pruning, there is a function that given an environment and a term, determines if there are variables in the term that are in the domain of the environment.

#### 2.1.2 Term Internals

The interface includes a function that returns the set of variables in a term, and a function that returns the terms carried by a term. Other subterms are accessed via position oriented functions. Recall that a position is a finite sequence of natural numbers, and the message in t that occurs at p, is written t@p. The interface includes a data type for a position that hides its implementation. The interface also includes the ancestors function anc(t, p) and the carried positions function carpos(t, t') as defined in the specification.

Each algebra provides a way to obtain a set of positions at which a subterm occurs within a term, and a way to replace the subterm at a given position with another term. These functions are used to generalize by variable separation.

**Definition 2.1** (All Positions). Given a term t, the set of positions at which t occurs in t' is allpos(t, t'), where

$$allpos(t, t') = \begin{cases} \{\langle \rangle \} & \text{if } t' \equiv t, \text{ else} \\ \{\langle i \rangle \cap p \mid p \in allpos(t, t_i), i < n \} \\ & \text{if } t' = f(t_0, \dots, t_{n-1}), \text{ else} \\ \{\} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

**Definition 2.2** (Replace). Given terms t and t', and position p, the term

that results from replacing the term at p with t in t', is replace(t, p, t'), where

$$replace(t, \langle \rangle, t') = t;$$

$$replace(t, \langle i \rangle \cap p, f(t_0, \dots, t_{n-1})) = f(t'_0, \dots, t'_{n-1}) \text{ where}$$

$$t'_j = \begin{cases} replace(t, p, t_i) & \text{if } i = j; \\ t_j & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

### 2.1.3 Encryptions and Derivations

Finally, the remaining functions in the interface are the ones that expose the encryption oriented properties of terms. The decryption key function returns the key used to decrypt a term if it is an encryption, otherwise it returns an error indicator. The *encryptions* function returns the set of encryption terms carried by a term, each one paired with its encryption key. The penetrator derivable function from the section in the specification of the same name is in the interface. Given a derivable predicate that has been specialized with a given set of supported terms and a set of atoms to avoid, a target term, and a source term, the protectors function returns an error indicator if the target is carried by the source outside of an encryption, where the derivable predicate is used to determine if a decryption key can be used to expose the target. Otherwise, it returns a set of encryptions in the source that carry the target and have underivable decryption keys. If two encryptions protect the target, only the outside one is returned. The inside encryption is the one that is carried by the outside encryption. Pseudo code for the decryption key and the protectors functions is in the specification.

## Chapter 3

### Protocols and Preskeletons

Terms over an order-sorted signature extended from a message signature describe key data structures in the CPSA program. Given a message signature that defines the sort mess and the atoms, the additional sorts and operations are in the CPSA Signature in Table 3.1. The signature uses the sort s list for sequences of terms of sort s, and the sort s set for injective sequences of terms of sort s. The sorts used in the signature are in Table 3.2.

Some of the terms over a CPSA signature are not well-formed, and omitted from interpretation. The text describing a term of a sort includes the conditions for it being well-formed.

In what follows, the external syntax for protocols is presented, and later, its translation into terms over a CPSA signature. For preskeletons, the internal representation is presented first, followed by its external syntax.

Additional sort symbols: evt, role, maplet, instance, node, ordering, and preskel

Table 3.1: CPSA Signature

```
the sort of all messages (implementation of \top)
   mesg
     evt
          a transmission or reception event
   trace
          a sequence of events used in a role
          a trace, a non-originating set, and a uniquely-originating set
    role
          a set of roles
protocol
          a natural number
     nat
          a map from a role variable to a preskeleton term
 maplet
instance
          a strand's trace and inheritance as instantiated from a role
   node
          a pair of numbers, a strand identifier and a strand position
ordering
          a causal ordering between a pair of nodes
 preskel
          a preskeleton
```

Table 3.2: Protocol and Preskeleton Sorts




Figure 3.1: Needham-Schroeder Initiator and Responder Roles

### 3.1 Protocols

A protocol defines the patterns of allowed behavior for non-adversarial participants, called the *regular* participants. The behavior of each regular participant is an instance of a protocol template, called a role. Figure 3.1 displays the roles that make up the Needham-Schroeder protocol.

In S-expression syntax, a protocol is a named set of roles and is defined by the defprotocol form. See PROTOCOL in Table A.1, Appendix A.

```
(defprotocol ns basic
  (defrole init ...)
  (defrole resp ...))
```

The name of this protocol (ID) is ns, and the second identifier (ALG) names the message algebra in use. The identifier for the Basic Crypto Algebra is basic.

Figure 3.2: Needham-Schroeder Responder Role

During the reading process, the appropriate algebra is implicitly bound to the internal representation of a protocol and many data structures derived from it. The protocol name is used at read time to bind it with its usages, and for output and error messages, but is otherwise unused and thus omitted from the design specification. The internal representation of a protocol is simply a set of roles—as a term of sort role set in Table 3.1.

The S-expression syntax for a role has a name, a declared set of variables, and a trace that provides a template for the behavior of its instances. A trace is a non-empty sequence of events, either a message transmission or a reception. An outbound term is (send t) and an inbound message with term t is (recv t). The translations of events are +[t] and -[t] respectively, where [t] is the translation of the S-expression t into an term of sort mesg in Table 3.1. Needham-Schroeder responder's role in S-expression syntax is in Figure 3.2.

Some atoms in a role have special properties. The atoms listed in the non-orig form are assumed to be non-originating, and those in the uniq-orig form are assumed to be uniquely originating. The implications of these assumption is as in the specification.

Internally, role r(C, N, U) has a trace C, and two sets of atoms, N and U. The atoms in N are assumed to be non-originating, and the atoms in U are assumed to be uniquely originating. As with protocols, the name is used during input and output, but omitted from this specification.

A role is well-formed if it satisfies the conditions listed for a role in the specification. A protocol is well-formed if no variable occurs in more than one role. The external syntax used by CPSA uses variable renaming to create the illusion that the same variable may occur in two roles. In the external syntax, two roles may share the same identifier.

Associated with each protocol is an implicit set of roles. For each term t in its algebra, there is a *listener role* of the form  $lsn(t) = r(\langle -t, +t \rangle, \langle \rangle, \langle \rangle)$ . A listener role is used to assert that a term is not a secret. In the implementary

tation, the only difference between a listener role and non-listener roles is its name is the empty string, a fact used when printing.

### 3.2 Preskeletons

The other key CPSA data structure is a preskeleton—see the k operator in Table 3.1. A preskeleton is used to encode classes of protocol executions, including its shapes, the answers produced by CPSA. One component of a preskeleton is its protocol, and one component is a set of strands. There are more components, but the set's representation is presented next.

As in the specification, a sequence of instances represents a set of strands. The instance i(r, h, E) contains a role r, a positive number h called its height, the length of the trace associated with the instance, and an environment E, a term of sort maplet set.

The environment E is well-formed if it represents the order-sorted substitution  $\sigma_E$  such that for every maplet  $\mathbf{m}(x,y)$ ,  $\sigma_E x = y$ . Note that x is always a variable, unlike its analog in the external syntax. An instance is well-formed if its role is well-formed, its environment is well-formed, and its height is not greater that the length of its role's trace.

The set of strands in a preskeleton is represented by a sequence of instances. The identity of a strand is its position in the sequence, which is where the description of its trace is located. The node  $\mathbf{n}(s,p)$  is associated with the event at position p in strand s's trace. In other words, if I is a sequence of instances, the event at  $\mathbf{n}(s,p)$ , written  $evt(I,\mathbf{n}(s,p))$ , is  $\sigma_E(C(p))$ , where  $I(s) = \mathbf{i}(\mathbf{r}(C,N,U),h,E)$  and  $p < h \leq |C|$ . A node associated with an inbound term is a reception node, and a node associated with an outbound term is a transmission node. The term stripped of its direction is written  $msg(I,\mathbf{n}(s,p))$ . The set of nodes in sequence I is  $\{\mathbf{n}(s,p) \mid s < |I|, I(s) = \mathbf{i}(r,h,E), p < h\}$ .

The preskeleton k(P, I, O, N, U) contains a protocol P, a non-empty sequence of instances I, a set of communication orderings O, a set of non-originating terms N, and a set of uniquely originating terms U. The node ordering  $o(n_0, n_1)$  asserts that  $n_0$  precedes  $n_1$ , that the event at  $n_0$  is outbound, the event at  $n_1$  is inbound, and  $n_0$  and  $n_1$  are on different strands. The atoms in N are assumed to be non-originating, and the atoms in U are assumed to be uniquely originating.

Members of the set of communication orderings O relate nodes in differing




Figure 3.3: Needham-Schroeder Shape  $(K_A^{-1}$  uncompromised,  $N_2$  fresh)

strands. There is an implied ordering of nodes within the same strand. Strand succession orderings of the form o(n(s, p-1), n(s, p)), where 0 and <math>h is the height of strand s are implicit, and must not be in O.

Associated with each preskeleton k is a graph. The vertices of the graph are the nodes of the instance sequence I, and the edges are the reverse of the both communication ordering O and the implied strand succession orderings. The edges are reversed because events in a node's past are of interest when analyzing a node. When the graph is acyclic, the transitive asymmetric relation  $\prec_k$  of k is the transitive closure of the graph, and  $n_0 \prec_k n_1$  asserts that the message event at  $n_0$  precedes the one at  $n_1$ . (A preskeleton with a graph that contains cycles is not well-formed.)

To be well-formed, in addition to the requirements on communication orderings listed above, a preskeleton must satisfy the same conditions listed for a preskeleton in the specification.

A Needham-Schroeder shape in traditional Strand Space notation is in Figure 3.3, and its representation using order-sorted terms is given in Figure 3.4.

### 3.2.1 Preskeleton S-Expression Syntax

The defskeleton form in Table A.1, Appendix A is used to specify a preskeleton in S-expression syntax. (With the exception of the initial problem statement, a preskeleton is always a skeleton.) On output, a preskeleton Referring to Table A.1, the ID in the preskeleton form names a protocol. It refers to the most recent protocol definition of that name which precedes the preskeleton form in the input. The ID in the defstrand form names a role. The integer in the strand form gives the height of the strand. The sequence of pairs of terms in the strand form specify an environment used to construct

```
With A, A', A'', B, B', B'', C: name, N_1, N_1', N_1'', N_2, N_2', N_2'': text:  resp = \mathsf{r}(resp_t, \langle \rangle, \langle \rangle) \text{ where } \\ resp_t = \langle -\{N_1, A\}_{K_B}, +\{N_1, N_2\}_{K_A}, -\{N_2\}_{K_B} \rangle \\ init = \mathsf{r}(init_t, \langle \rangle, \langle \rangle) \text{ where } \\ init_t = \langle +\{N_1', A'\}_{K_{B'}}, -\{N_1', N_2'\}_{K_{A'}}, +\{N_2'\}_{K_{B'}} \rangle \\ \mathsf{k}(\langle resp, init \rangle, I, O, \langle K_{A''}^{-1} \rangle, \langle N_2'' \rangle) \text{ where } \\ I = \langle \mathsf{i}(resp, 3, E), \mathsf{i}(init, 3, E') \rangle \\ E = \langle \mathsf{m}(A, A''), \mathsf{m}(B, B''), \mathsf{m}(N_1, N_1''), \mathsf{m}(N_2, N_2'') \rangle \\ E' = \langle \mathsf{m}(A', A''), \mathsf{m}(B', C), \mathsf{m}(N_1', N_1''), \mathsf{m}(N_2', N_2'') \rangle \\ O = \langle \mathsf{o}(\mathsf{n}(0, 1), \mathsf{n}(1, 1)), \mathsf{o}(\mathsf{n}(1, 2), \mathsf{n}(0, 2)) \rangle
```

Figure 3.4: Needham-Schroeder Preskeleton

```
(defskeleton ns (vars (n2 n1 text) (a b b-0 name))
  (defstrand resp 3 (n2 n2) (n1 n1) (b b) (a a))
  (defstrand init 3 (n1 n1) (n2 n2) (a a) (b b-0))
  (precedes ((0 1) (1 1)) ((1 2) (0 2)))
  (non-orig (privk a))
  (uniq-orig n2))
```

Figure 3.5: Needham-Schroeder defskeleton

the events in a strand from its role's trace. The first term is interpreted using the role's variables and the second term uses the preskeleton's variables. The environment used to produce the strand's trace is derived by matching the second term using the first term as a pattern. The deflistener form creates an instance of a listener role for the given term.

The precedes form specifies members of the node relation. The first integer in a node identifies the strand using the order in which strands are defined in the defskeleton form.

A variable may occur in more then one role within a protocol. The reader performs a renaming so as to ensure these occurrences do not overlap. Furthermore, the maplets used to specify a strand need not specify how to map every role variable. The reader inserts missing mappings, and renames every preskeleton variable that also occurs in a role of its protocol. The sort

of every preskeleton variable that occurs in the non-orig or uniq-orig list or in a maplet must be declared, using the vars form.

Needham-Schroeder shape in S-expression syntax is displayed in Figure 3.5. The effect of reader renaming is shown in Figure 3.4 by adding primes to variables.

The PROT-ALIST, ROLE-ALIST, and SKEL-ALIST productions in Table A.1 are Lisp style association lists, that is, lists of key-value pairs, where every key is a symbol. Key-value pairs with unrecognized keys are ignored, and are available for use by other tools. On output, unrecognized key-value pairs are preserved when printing protocols, but elided when printing preskeletons.

See the CPSA Primer for more examples of CPSA external syntax.

## Chapter 4

### Reductions

This chapter describes the implementation-oriented refinements made to support reduction that are considered too detailed to be included in the specification.

In the CPSA implementation and the design formalism, every preskeleton includes a link to its protocol. Two preskeletons are not related by a homomorphism unless they specify the same protocol.

For each preskeleton k, the implementation maintains an *origination map*,  $\mathcal{O}(k,t)$ . It maps each of the preskeleton's uniquely originating terms to the set of nodes at which it originates. For hulled preskeletons, the range of this map must contain singleton sets or the empty set. The origination map returns an error indicator when given a term not assumed to be uniquely originating, a feature used to check the implementation's consistency.

Each preskeleton contains the state of a variable generator. It's used to ensure a source of fresh variables for any preskeleton derived from it.

### 4.1 Preskeleton Reductions

Given a well-formed preskeleton, an attempt is made to convert it into a set of skeletons. This section describes a few implementation details omitted from the specification.

The implementation uses sequences to represent some sets. The function nub removes duplicates from a sequence.

#### 4.1.1 Substitution

The function  $\mathbb{S}_{\sigma}$  applies the order-sorted substitution  $\sigma$  to a preskeleton.

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{S}_{\sigma}(\mathsf{k}(P,I,O,N,U)) &= \mathsf{k}(P,\mathbb{S}_{\sigma} \circ I,O,nub(\sigma \circ N),nub(\sigma \circ U)) \\ \mathbb{S}_{\sigma}(\mathsf{i}(r,h,E)) &= \mathsf{i}(r,h,\mathbb{S}_{\sigma} \circ E) \\ \mathbb{S}_{\sigma}(\mathsf{m}(x,y)) &= \mathsf{m}(x,\sigma(y)) \end{split}$$

The substitution is permitted as long as it preserves the nodes at which each uniquely originating term originates. In other words, the substitution is permitted only if for each uniquely originating term t in k,  $\mathcal{O}(k,t) \subseteq \mathcal{O}(k',\sigma(t))$ , where  $k' = \mathbb{S}_{\sigma}(k)$ . The implicit homomorphism is  $(\phi_{\mathrm{id}},\sigma)$ , where  $\phi_{\mathrm{id}}$  is the identity strand map for k.

### 4.1.2 Compression

The function  $\mathbb{C}_{s,s'}$  compresses s into s' in a preskeleton.

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{C}_{s,s'}(\mathsf{k}(P,I,O,N,U)) &= \mathsf{k}(P,I\circ\phi_s',\mathbb{C}_\phi\circ O,N,U) \\ \mathbb{C}_\phi(\mathsf{o}(n_0,n_1)) &= \mathsf{o}(\mathbb{C}_\phi(n_0),\mathbb{C}_\phi(n_1)) \\ \mathbb{C}_\phi(\mathsf{n}(s,p)) &= \mathsf{n}(\phi(s),p) \\ \phi(j) &= \phi_{s,s'}(j) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \phi_s(s') & \text{if } j=s \\ \phi_s(j) & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right. \\ \phi_s(j) &= \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} j-1 & \text{if } j>s \\ j & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right. \\ \phi_s'(j) &= \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} j+1 & \text{if } j\geq s \\ j & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right. \end{split}$$

where the trace of I(s) is a prefix of the trace of I(s'). Although not shown, orderings of the form o(n(s,p),n(s,p')) are removed from the ordering when p < p', so they do not cause the output preskeleton to fail to be well-formed. The implicit homomorphism is  $(\phi_{s,s'},\sigma_{id})$ , where  $\sigma_{id}$  is the identity substitution. Note that  $\phi_{s,s'} \circ \phi'_s = \sigma_{id}$ .

#### 4.1.3 Transitive Reduction

The function  $\mathbb{R}$  performs a transitive reduction on a preskeleton's node relation. The transitive reduction of an ordering is the minimal ordering such that both orderings have the same transitive closure. Here, communication orderings implied by transitive closure are removed.

The transitive reduction of a skeleton is isomorphic to the skeleton. The reduction is performed to speed up the code that checks for isomorphisms. When two skeletons are transitively reduced, and isomorphic, they have the same number of communication orderings.

In the implementation, transitive reduction is the last operation applied to a preskeleton during the process of converting a preskeleton into a pruned skeleton. Isomorphism testing is only performed on pruned skeletons.

### 4.2 Augmentation

The function  $\mathbb{A}_{i,n}$  augments a preskeleton with a new strand. It appends the instance i to the sequence of instances, adds a node ordering, and adds atoms as specified by the role. The function orders the last node in the strand before some node in the preskeleton.

$$\begin{split} \mathbb{A}_{i,n}(\mathsf{k}(P,I,O,N,U)) &= \mathsf{k}(P,I \cap \langle i \rangle, \langle \mathsf{o}(\mathsf{n}(|I|,h-1),n) \rangle \cap O, N_1, U_1) \\ i &= \mathsf{i}(\mathsf{r}(C,N_0,U_0),h,E) \\ N_1 &= nub(N \cap \sigma_e \circ N_0) \\ U_1 &= nub(U \cap \sigma_e \circ U_0) \end{split}$$

Although not shown, elements in  $N_1$  that contain a variable that does not occur in some event in the constructed preskeleton are dropped, as are elements in  $U_1$  that are not carried in some event in the constructed preskeleton. As with the preskeleton reductions in Section 4.1, it is straightforward to derive the homomorphism associated with a successful augmentation.

### 4.3 Generalization

The generalization process is the only part of the algorithm that requires non-isomorphic homomorphisms to be explicitly represented. To make this possible, every preskeleton contains two additional fields not yet described, a link to the point-of-view skeleton, and a POV strand map. The POV strand map is the second component of the homomorphism from the point-of-view skeleton to the preskeleton. The first component can be generated via matching using the point-of-view skeleton.

The POV strand map is maintained by every reduction applied to a preskeleton. The compression reduction is the only one that requires careful thought.

## Chapter 5

## Search Strategy

The top-level loop maintains two sequences of skeletons, a to do list, and a set of skeletons that have already been seen. When the to do list is empty, the loop exits.

For each problem statement, CPSA attempts the convert the preskeleton into a skeleton. If the conversion fails, an error is signaled. Otherwise, a search is started with the skeleton as the POV skeleton of Section 4.3. The top-level loop starts with the POV skeleton as the single member of the to do list and the seen set.

The following steps constitute one iteration of the top-level loop. The first skeleton on the to do list is removed and is the subject of the iteration. If the skeleton is unrealized, contraction and augmentation are used to compute its cohort. Otherwise, generalization reductions are tried in an effort to make one generalization step. The generated skeletons are the subject's children. Each child that is isomorphic to a member of the seen set is dropped. The other children are added to the seen set and to the end of the to do list. The final step in the iteration is to print the subject skeleton.

When the subject in unrealized, the test node is selected as follows. The strands are considered in reverse order, and the first unrealized node in one of the strands is used as the test node. The program happens to try atoms for critical messages before it tries encryptions, but the overall results should be independent of the algorithms used to select test nodes and critical messages, an assertion that requires justification. The encryptions considered as critical messages are obtained using the *encryptions* function in the algebra interface.

## Chapter 6

## Visualization

This section describes the Causally Intuitive Preskeleton Layout algorithm used to generate visualizations of preskeletons. The algorithm is simple to implement and explain, and because it is designed for preskeletons, it produces better results than is available from generic graph layout algorithms, such as the ones used by Graphviz [2].

The preskeleton is prepared by performing a transitive reduction on its ordering relation. Communication edges implied by transitive closure are removed. The result is called a Hasse diagram.

The Hasse diagram is created by considering each communication edge. If there is a path from its source to its destination that does not traverse the edge, the edge is deleted.

To simplify the task, each strand is laid out vertically with early nodes above later ones. The strands are horizontally placed in the same order as they appear in the preskeleton. The spacing between successive nodes on a strand is the same, as is the horizontal spacing between strands. The vertical position of a node is called its rank.

Within this framework, the simplest layout algorithm is to use the position of the node in its strand as its rank. When using this layout strategy, the only difficultly occurs when a node ordering arrow crosses over a node in an unrelated strand. To avoid ambiguity, arrows that cross strands are curved.

When using position based ranking, the result often contains upward sloping arrows. Within a strand, no node that is after a node is above the node, but with upward sloping arrows, this property no longer holds. The motivation for the Causally Intuitive Preskeleton Layout algorithm is that

eliminating upward sloping arrows makes causal relations easier to grasp.

The layout algorithm has two phases. The first phase stretches strands so as to eliminate upwardly sloping arrows, and the second phase compresses them so as to eliminate some unnecessary stretching. Without phase two, some nodes early in a strand appear to be oddly separated from others in the strand.

Each phase starts with a to do list containing every node in the preskeleton. For each node in the to do list, if conditions are met, it updates the current node ranking and adds nodes to the to do list. The phase is finished when the to do list is empty.

Phase I starts with the position based ranking r(s, p) = p. Let P(n) be the set the predecessors of node n, excluding the nodes on the strand of n. Let  $P_r(n) = \{r(n') \mid n' \in P(n)\}$  be the ranks of P(n). The stretch rule is considered for each element in the to do list.

The stretch rule applies to node  $n_1$  if  $r(n_1) < h$ , where  $h = \max(\{r(n_1)\} \cup P_r(n_1))$ . In that case, the ranking is updated so that  $r(n_1) = h$ , and the linearize rule is applied to the next strand node if it exists.

The linearize rule applies to node  $n_1$  if  $r(n_1) \leq r(n_0)$ , where  $n_0$  is the previous strand node. In that case, the ranking is updated so that  $r(n_1) = r(n_0)+1$ , the to do list is augmented with elements in  $S(n_1)$ , and the linearize rule is applied to the next strand node if it exists, where S(n) is the set the successors of node n, excluding the nodes on the strand of n.

In phase II, the compress rule is considered for each element in the to do list. It applies to node  $n_1$  with a next strand node of  $n_2$  if  $r(n_1) < h$ , where  $h = \min(\{r(n_2) - 1\}\} \cup S_r(n_1))$  and  $S_r(n)$  is the ranks of S(n). In that case, the ranking is updated so that  $r(n_1) = h$ , and the to do list is augmented with elements in  $P(n_1)$  and the previous strand node of  $n_1$  if it exists.

# Acknowledgement

Carolyn Talcott provided valuable feedback on drafts of this document.

## Appendix A

## Basic Crypto Algebra Syntax Reference

The complete syntax for the analyzer using the Basic Crypto Algebra is shown in Table A.1. The start grammar symbol is FILE, and the terminal grammar symbols are: (, ), SYMBOL, STRING, INTEGER, and the constants set in typewriter font.

The ALIST, PROT-ALIST, ROLE-ALIST, and SKEL-ALIST productions are Lisp style association lists, that is, lists of key-value pairs, where every key is a symbol. Key-value pairs with unrecognized keys are ignored, and are available for use by other tools. On output, unrecognized key-value pairs are preserved when printing protocols, but elided when printing skeletons.

The contents of a file can be interpreted as a sequence of S-expressions. The S-expressions used are restricted so that most dialects of Lisp can read them, and characters within symbols and strings never need quoting. Sevenbit ASCII is used to encode characters. Every list is proper. An S-expression atom is either a SYMBOL, an INTEGER, or a STRING. The characters that make up a symbol are the letters, the digits, and the special characters in "-\*/<=>!?:\$%\_&~^+". A symbol may not begin with a digit or a sign followed by a digit. The characters that make up a string are the ASCII printing characters omitting double quote and backslash. Double quotes delimit a string. A comment begins with a semicolon, or is an S-expression list at top-level that starts with the comment symbol.

```
FILE \leftarrow HERALD? FORM+
   HERALD ← (herald TITLE ALIST)
     TITLE \leftarrow SYMBOL | STRING
     FORM \leftarrow COMMENT \mid PROTOCOL \mid SKELETON
 COMMENT \leftarrow (comment ...)
 PROTOCOL ← (defprotocol ID ALG ROLE+ PROT-ALIST)
         ID \leftarrow SYMBOL
       ALG \leftarrow SYMBOL
      ROLE ← (defrole ID VARS TRACE ROLE-ALIST)
      VARS ← (vars DECL*)
      DECL \leftarrow (ID + SORT)
      SORT ← text | data | name | skey | akey | mesg
     TRACE \leftarrow (trace EVENT+)
     EVENT ← (send TERM) | (recv TERM)
            \leftarrow ID | (pubk ID) | (privk ID) | (invk ID)
     TERM
                 (ltk ID ID) | STRING | (cat TERM+)
                 (enc TERM+ TERM)
                 (non-orig HT-TERM*) ROLE-ALIST
ROLE-ALIST
                 (uniq-orig TERM*) ROLE-ALIST | ...
  \text{HT-TERM} \leftarrow
                 TERM | (INTEGER TERM)
PROT-ALIST \leftarrow
 SKELETON ← (defskeleton ID VARS
                      STRAND+ SKEL-ALIST)
   STRAND ← (defstrand ID INTEGER MAPLET*)
                 (deflistener TERM)
   MAPLET
             \leftarrow (TERM TERM)
             ← (non-orig TERM*) SKEL-ALIST
SKEL-ALIST
                 (uniq-orig TERM*) SKEL-ALIST
                 (precedes NODE-PAIR*) SKEL-ALIST | ...
                 (NODE NODE)
NODE-PAIR
                 (INTEGER INTEGER)
      NODE \leftarrow
```

Table A.1: CPSA Syntax

## Appendix B

# The Basic Crypto Many-Sorted Algebra

The implementation uses a many-sorted algebra. The many-sorted message algebra described here is a reduction of the order-sorted message algebra in Table 2.1 using the method described in [3, Section 4]. The order-sorted message signature is reproduced in Table B.1 in a form that uses prefix notation for every term formed using an operator. In the related many-sorted signature in Table B.2, the inclusion function symbols are text, data, name, skey, and akey. Section 4 of the paper describes the sense in which algebras that model the many-sorted signature are essentially the same as the ones that model the order-sorted message signature.

Terms are constructed from a set I of identifiers and a set of functions symbols. The symbols of arity one are text, data, name, skey, akey, pubk, and invk. The symbols of arity two are ltk, cat, and enc. The signature is given

```
Base sort symbols: name, text, data, skey, akey
Non-base sort symbol: mesg
```

Subsorts: name, text, data, akey, skey < mesg

pubk: name  $\rightarrow$  akey invk: akey  $\rightarrow$  akey ltk: name  $\times$  name  $\rightarrow$  skey enc: mesg  $\times$  mesg  $\rightarrow$  mesg cat: mesg  $\times$  mesg  $\rightarrow$  mesg  $C_i$ : mesg

Axiom:  $invk(invk(x)) \approx x$  for x: akey

Table B.1: Basic Crypto Order-Sorted Signature

Sort symbols: name, text, data, skey, akey, and mesg pubk: name  $\rightarrow$  akey invk: akey  $\rightarrow$  akey ltk: name  $\times$  name  $\rightarrow$  skey enc: mesg  $\times$  mesg  $\rightarrow$  mesg cat: mesg  $\times$  mesg  $\rightarrow$  mesg  $C_i$ : mesg name: name  $\rightarrow$  mesg text: text  $\rightarrow$  mesg data: data  $\rightarrow$  mesg skey: skey  $\rightarrow$  mesg akey: skey  $\rightarrow$  mesg Axiom: invk(invk(x))  $\approx x$  for x: akey

Table B.2: Basic Crypto Many-Sorted Signature

in Table B.2. Grammar rules define the terms used by this algebra. The set of asymmetric keys K is defined as follows.

$$K \leftarrow I \mid \mathsf{pubk}(I) \mid \mathsf{invk}(I) \mid \mathsf{invk}(\mathsf{pubk}(I))$$

The key invk(x) is the inverse of the asymmetric key x, and pubk(x) is principal x's public key.

Each occurrence of an identifier in a term is associated with a sort symbol. The context in which an identifier occurs determines the sort. The sort symbols are text, data, name, akey, skey, and mesg, where a name refers to a principal. An identifier occurrence in an asymmetric key of the form  $\mathsf{pubk}(x)$  has sort name, otherwise it has sort akey.

The set of atoms B is defined as follows.

$$B \leftarrow \mathsf{text}(I) \mid \mathsf{data}(I) \mid \mathsf{name}(I) \mid \mathsf{skey}(I) \mid \mathsf{skey}(\mathsf{ltk}(I,I)) \mid \mathsf{akey}(K)$$

The atom  $\mathsf{skey}(\mathsf{ltk}(x,y))$  is a symmetric, long term key shared between two principals x, and y. The occurrence of x in  $\mathsf{text}(x)$  has sort  $\mathsf{text}$ , sort data for  $\mathsf{data}(x)$ , sort name for  $\mathsf{name}(x)$ , and sort skey for  $\mathsf{skey}(x)$ . The occurrences of x and y in  $\mathsf{skey}(\mathsf{ltk}(x,y))$  both have sort name.

The set of terms T is defined as follows.

$$T \leftarrow I \mid B \mid Q \mid \mathsf{cat}(T,T) \mid \mathsf{enc}(T,T)$$

where Q is the set of tags, represented by quoted string literals. The second argument in **enc** is a term for a key. A term of the form x is called an indeterminate, and the identifier occurrence has sort mesg.

The terms of interest are well-formed. A term is well-formed if every occurrence of each identifier has the same sort. An example of a non-well-formed term is cat(x, akey(x)) because the identifier x occurs with two sorts,

mesg and akey. A pair of well-formed terms are *compatible* if every identifier that occurs in both terms occurs with the same sort.

A term is a variable if it specifies an identifier and its sort.

$$V \leftarrow I \mid \mathsf{text}(I) \mid \mathsf{data}(I) \mid \mathsf{name}(I) \mid \mathsf{skey}(I) \mid \mathsf{akey}(I)$$

When a term is well-formed, the same variable is associated every occurrence of an identifier in a term.

There are efficient ways of implementing unification for this algebra because there are efficient ways for implementing for unification in equational theories representable by a convergent term rewrite system [1]. As long as terms are compatible, substitutions produced by unifiers map an identifier that occurs with a given sort to a term of the same sort. Depending on the sort symbol, a substitution is limited to the following forms:

```
\begin{array}{llll} \operatorname{mesg} & I \mapsto I & I \mapsto B & I \mapsto \operatorname{cat}(T,T) & I \mapsto \operatorname{enc}(T,T) \dots \\ \operatorname{akey} & I \mapsto I & I \mapsto \operatorname{pubk}(I) & I \mapsto \operatorname{invk}(I) & I \mapsto \operatorname{invk}(\operatorname{pubk}(I)) \\ \operatorname{skey} & I \mapsto I & I \mapsto \operatorname{ltk}(I,I) \\ \operatorname{text} & I \mapsto I \\ \operatorname{data} & I \mapsto I \\ \operatorname{name} & I \mapsto I \end{array}
```

The current implementation uses an algorithm for unification without equations described by Laurence Paulson [4, Page 381] with modifications to the unification functions as shown in Figure B.1, where  $e:: \ell \text{ means } \langle e \rangle \cap \ell$ . The function unify calls unify\_aux in the unmodified version.

```
unify(\ell, t, t') = unify_aux(\ell, chase(\ell, t), chase(\ell, t'))
chase(\ell, x) =
      let t = \mathsf{lookup}(x, \ell) in
      if x = t then x else \mathsf{chase}(\ell, t)
                                                                                           (!)
chase(\ell, invk(t)) = chase_invk(\ell, t)
chase(\ell, t) = t
\mathsf{chase\_invk}(\ell, x) =
                                                                                           (!)
      let t = \mathsf{lookup}(x, \ell) in
                                                                                           (!)
      if x = t then invk(x) else chase_invk(\ell, t)
                                                                                           (!)
                                                                                           (!)
chase_invk(\ell, invk(t)) = chase(\ell, t)
                                                                                           (!)
chase_invk(\ell, t) = invk(t)
lookup(x, \langle \rangle) = x
lookup(x, (y, t) :: \ell) = if x = y then t else <math>lookup(x, \ell)
unify_aux(\ell, x, x) = \ell
unify_aux(\ell, x, t) = if occurs(x, t) then raise failure else (x, t) :: \ell
unify_aux(\ell, t, x) = unify_aux(\ell, x, t)
unify_aux(\ell, invk(x), pubk(y)) = unify_aux(\ell, x, invk(pubk(y))) (!)
\mathsf{unify\_aux}(\ell,\mathsf{pubk}(x),\mathsf{invk}(y)) = \mathsf{unify\_aux}(\ell,y,\mathsf{invk}(\mathsf{pubk}(x))) \quad (!)
unify_aux(\ell, f(t, ...), f(t', ...)) = unify_list(\ell, \langle t, ... \rangle, \langle t', ... \rangle)
unify_aux(\ell, t, t') = raise failure
unify_list(\ell, \langle \rangle, \langle \rangle) = \ell
\mathsf{unify\_list}(\ell, t :: u, t' :: u') = \mathsf{unify\_list}(\mathsf{unify}(\ell, t, t'), u, u')
unify_list(\ell, u, u') = raise failure
```

Figure B.1: Unifier

```
\begin{split} & \mathsf{match}(\ell,x,t) = \\ & \mathsf{if} \neg \mathsf{bound}(x,\ell) \; \mathsf{then} \; (x,t) :: \ell \\ & \mathsf{else} \; \mathsf{if} \; \mathsf{lookup}(x,\ell) = t \; \mathsf{then} \; \ell \\ & \mathsf{else} \; \mathsf{raise} \; \mathsf{failure} \\ & \mathsf{match}(\ell,\mathsf{invk}(x),\mathsf{pubk}(y)) = \mathsf{match}(\ell,x,\mathsf{invk}(\mathsf{pubk}(y))) \; \; (!) \\ & \mathsf{match}(\ell,f(t,\ldots),f(t',\ldots)) = \mathsf{match\_list}(\ell,\langle t,\ldots\rangle,\langle t',\ldots\rangle) \\ & \mathsf{match}(\ell,t,t') = \mathsf{raise} \; \mathsf{failure} \\ & \mathsf{bound}(x,\langle\rangle) = \mathsf{false} \\ & \mathsf{bound}(x,\langle\rangle) = \mathsf{false} \\ & \mathsf{bound}(x,\langle\rangle) = \mathsf{false} \\ & \mathsf{bound}(x,\langle\rangle,\langle\rangle) = \ell \\ & \mathsf{match\_list}(\ell,\zeta),\langle\rangle) = \ell \\ & \mathsf{match\_list}(\ell,t::u,t'::u') = \mathsf{match\_list}(\mathsf{match}(\ell,t,t'),u,u') \\ & \mathsf{match\_list}(\ell,u,u') = \mathsf{raise} \; \mathsf{failure} \end{split}
```

Figure B.2: Matcher

## Appendix C

## Diffie-Hellman

Table C.1 contains the signature used for Diffie-Hellman analysis. In this algebra, there is an equation for the commutativity of exponents, but there is no equation for associativity. Therefore, this algebra cannot be used to analyze group Diffie-Hellman protocols.

The equation for exponentiation is  $(h^x)^y \approx (h^y)^x$  for h: base and x,y: expn. Unification and matching in this algebra produce a finite number of most general unifiers, that is, the unification type is finitary. For example,  $\{x \mapsto u, y \mapsto v\}$  and  $\{x \mapsto G^v, u \mapsto G^y\}$  and unify  $x^y$  and  $u^v$ . Unification is finitary because of an approximation. To unify  $a^{xy}$  and  $b^{wz}$ , we unify  $a^{xy}$  with  $G^{uv}$  and  $G^{vu}$  with  $b^{wz}$ , where u and v are freshly generated variables. In other words, for the purpose of unification only, the equation for exponentiation is  $(G^x)^y \approx (G^y)^x$ .

Base sort symbols: name, text, data, skey, akey, expn Non-base sort symbols: mesg, base

Subsorts: name, text, data, akey, skey, expn, base < mesg

 $\{ |\cdot| \}_{(\cdot)} \colon \operatorname{mesg} \times \operatorname{mesg} \to \operatorname{mesg}$ Encryption  $(\cdot,\cdot)$ : mesg × mesg  $\rightarrow$  mesg Pairing "...": mesg

Tag constants

 $K_{(\cdot)}$ : name  $\rightarrow$  akey Public key of name

 $(\cdot)^{-1}$ : akey  $\rightarrow$  akey Inverse of asymmetric key Itk: name  $\times$  name  $\rightarrow$  skey Long term shared key

G: base Generator constant  $(\cdot)^{(\cdot)}$ : base  $\times$  expn  $\rightarrow$  base Exponentiation

> Axioms:  $(x^{-1})^{-1} \approx x$  for x: akey  $(h^x)^y \approx (h^y)^x$  for h: base and x, y: expn

Table C.1: Diffie-Hellman Signature

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