H      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~3 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone$3Certificate Usage callback possible returns values.%usage of certificate accepted&usage of certificate rejected'&Certificate and Chain rejection reason $%&'()*+"$%&'()*+$%&'()*+None BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone\Attempt to decode a bytestring representing an DER ASN.1 serialized object into the object.7Encode an ASN.1 Object to the DER serialized bytestring BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownSafe DirectionRole,Compression identification-Cipher identification.Session data to resume3 A session ID4Versions known to TLSDSSL2 is just defined, but this version is and will not be supported.,-./0123456789,-./0123456789,-./0123456789 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownSafe:A session manager<Aused on server side to decide whether to resume a client session.=#used when a session is established.>#used when a session is invalidated.:;<=>?:;<=>?:;<=>?NoneI   BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownSafe@'record some data about this connection.B$number of handshakes on this contextC#bytes received since last handshakeDbytes sent since last handshake @ABCD @ABCD@ABCD  BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneE EE NoneTThis is a strict version of andThis is a strict version of &&.verify that 2 bytestrings are equals. it's a non lazy version, that will compare every bytes. arguments with different length will bail out early    None$  BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownSafeNone  None F      F      F      BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone0LBdeprecated alert, should never be sent by compliant implementationl@TLS Exceptions related to bad user usage or asynchronous errorsmGEarly termination exception with the reason and the error associatedn(Handshake failed for the reason attachedojUsage error when the connection has not been established and the user is trying to send or receive datap5TLSError that might be returned through the TLS stackqmainly for instance of Errorthandshake policy failed.G !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdeLMNOPQRSTfUghVijkWXYZ[lmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~./0123456789EG! "$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdeLMNOPQRSTfUghVijkWXYZ[lmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~\]_`abcdefghijlmnopqrstuv:G  !"#$%&'( )*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ ABCDEFGHIJKHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdeLMNOPQRSTfUghVijkWXYZ[lmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneA collection of hooks actions.)called at each handshake message received1called at each certificate chain message received/hooks on IO and packets, receiving and sending.Hooks for logging8This is called when sending and receiving packets and IO  BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone#*NoneAT$+(for the md5 context, for the sha1 context)<F      BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneFor now we ignore the version, but perhaps some day the PRF will depend not only on the cipher PRF algorithm, but also on the protocol version.   BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNonetry to create a new credential object from a public certificate and the associated private key that are stored on the filesystem in PEM format. similar to V but take the certificate and private key from memory instead of from the filesystem. similar to / but also allow specifying chain certificates. similar to / but also allow specifying chain certificates.!public certificate (X.509 format)private key associated!public certificate (X.509 format)!chain certificates (X.509 format)private key associated   BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownSafeAT0This is the default compression which is a NOOP.Aevery compression need to be wrapped in this, to fit in structure>supported compression algorithms need to be part of this class+return the associated ID for this algorithmzdeflate (compress) a bytestring using a compression context and return the result along with the new compression context.winflate (decompress) a bytestring using a compression context and return the result along the new compression context.intersect a list of ids commonly given by the other side with a list of compression the function keeps the list of compression in order, to be able to find quickly the prefered compression.default null compression ,  BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneATCipher algorithmCheck if a specific 2 is allowed to be used with the version specified<@-  BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNonecurrent protocol versioncurrent key exchange type+support Next Protocol Negotiation extensionin certain cases, we haven't manage to decode ServerKeyExchange properly, because the decoding was too eager and the cipher wasn't been set yet. we keep the Server Key Exchange in it unparsed format, and this function is able to really decode the server key xchange if it's unparsed.fThe TLS12 PRF is cipher specific, and some TLS12 algorithms use SHA384 instead of the default SHA256.N      !"#$%&'()*+,-./01234" $%&'*-01234J      !"#$%&'()*+,-./01234 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone5-Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)6Next Protocol Negotiation7Secure Renegotiation8?Max fragment extension with length from 512 bytes to 4096 bytes9Server Name extension including the name type and the associated name. the associated name decoding is dependant of its name type. name type = 0 : hostname:KExtension class to transform bytes to and from a high level Extension type.;.all supported extensions by the implementation\<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTU5V6W7X8YZ[\9]:^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|};~Z<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJOPQRSTU5V6W7X8YZ[\9]:_`^bclmoqr{|};~=<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTU5V6W7X8YZ[\9]:^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|};~ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneQA set of callbacks run by the server for various corners of the TLS establishmentThis action is called when a client certificate chain is received from the client. When it returns a CertificateUsageReject value, the handshake is aborted.JThis action is called when the client certificate cannot be verified. A S argument indicates a wrong signature, a 'Just e' message signals a crypto error.iAllow the server to choose the cipher relative to the the client version and the client list of ciphers.xThis could be useful with old clients and as a workaround to the BEAST (where RC4 is sometimes prefered with TLS < 1.1)'The client cipher list cannot be empty.tAllow the server to indicate additional credentials to be used depending on the host name indicated by the client.This is most useful for transparent proxies where credentials must be generated on the fly according to the host the client is trying to connect to.Msuggested next protocols accoring to the next protocol negotiation extension.Qat each new handshake, we call this hook to see if we allow handshake to happens.NA set of callbacks run by the clients for various corners of TLS establishment This action is called when the server sends a certificate request. The parameter is the information from the request. The action should select a certificate chain of one of the given certificate types where the last certificate in the chain should be signed by one of the given distinguished names. Each certificate should be signed by the following one, except for the last. At least the first of the certificates in the chain must have a corresponding private key, because that is used for signing the certificate verify message.Note that is is the responsibility of this action to select a certificate matching one of the requested certificate types. Returning a non-matching one will lead to handshake failure later.Returning a certificate chain not matching the distinguished names may lead to problems or not, depending whether the server accepts it.DList all the supported algorithms, versions, ciphers, etc supported.Supported Versions by this context On the client side, the highest version will be used to establish the connection. On the server side, the highest version that is less or equal than the client version will be chosed.SSupported cipher methods. The default is empty, specify a suitable cipher list.  is often a good choice.supported compressions methodsrAll supported hash/signature algorithms pair for client certificate verification, ordered by decreasing priority./Secure renegotiation defined in RFC5746. If 7, clients send the renegotiation_info extension. If g, servers handle the extension or the renegotiation SCSV then send the renegotiation_info extension.If ], renegotiation is allowed from the client side. This is vulnerable to DOS attacks. If I, renegotiation is allowed only from the server side via HelloRequest.Set if we support session.4Support for fallback SCSV defined in RFC7507. If b, servers reject handshakes which suggest a lower protocol than the highest protocol supported.dIn ver <= TLS1.0, block ciphers using CBC are using CBC residue as IV, which can be guessed by an attacker. Hence, an empty packet is normally sent before a normal data packet, to prevent guessability. Some Microsoft TLS-based protocol implementations, however, consider these empty packets as a protocol violation and disconnect. If this parameter is Y, empty packets will never be added, which is less secure, but might help in rare cases."request a certificate from client. This is a list of certificates from which the disinguished names are sent in certificate request messages. For TLS1.0, it should not be empty.!~Server Optional Diffie Hellman parameters. If this value is not properly set, no Diffie Hellman key exchange will take place.)Define the name of the server, along with an extra service identification blob. this is important that the hostname part is properly filled for security reason, as it allow to properly associate the remote side with the given certificate during a handshake.The extra blob is useful to differentiate services running on the same host, but that might have different certificates given. It's only used as part of the X509 validation infrastructure.*Allow the use of the Server Name Indication TLS extension during handshake, which allow the client to specify which host name, it's trying to access. This is useful to distinguish CNAME aliasing (e.g. web virtual host).+1try to establish a connection using this session..IIn this element, you'll need to override the default empty value of of  with a suitable cipherlist.0-All settings should not be used in production2Disable the true randomness in favor of deterministic seed that will produce a deterministic random from. This is useful for tests and debugging purpose. Do not use in production3yAdd a way to print the seed that was randomly generated. re-using the same seed will reproduce the same randomness with 2I      !"#$%&'()*+,-./01234F$%&'()*+      !"#$%&'()*+,-./01234       !"#$%& '()*+,-./01234 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone<=IOT?<* BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone<=I BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone<=I7Set to Just-value when certificate request was received4Set to true when a client certificate chain was sent/Set to true when a certificate request was sent6Generate the master secret from the pre master secret.Set master secret and as a side effect generate the key block with all the right parameters, and setup the pending tx/rx state.8      !"#$%&'()*+,-./01chosen transmission version2the role (Client or Server) of the generating sidethe pre master secret23chosen version45/      !"#$%&'()*+,-./013      !"#$%&'()*+,-./012345  BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneC6Represent a TLS record.7Xturn a plaintext record into a compressed record using the compression function supplied8Tturn a compressed record into a ciphertext record using the cipher function supplied9Xturn a ciphertext fragment into a compressed fragment using the cipher function supplied:^turn a compressed fragment into a plaintext fragment using the decompression function supplied;&turn a record into an header and bytes<*turn a header and a fragment into a record=turn a record into a header>?@ABC6DEFGH789:;<=jkyz{|}~s>?@AC6DEFG789:;<=>?@ABC6DEFGH789:;<=! BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone:IJKLMIIJKLM" BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneNOPQRSTUNNOPQRSTU# BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone>?@AC6DEF;<=IN$ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone8Connection IO backend:,Flush the connection sending buffer, if any.;Close the connection.<)Send a bytestring through the connection.=6Receive specified number of bytes from the connection. 56789:;<=VWXY 56789:;<=56789:;<=VWXY% BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone>JA TLS Context keep tls specific state, parameters and backend information.?6return the backend object associated with this contextZKlist of allowed ciphers according to parameters and additional credentials[has the handle EOFed or not.\0has the handshake been done and been successful.]-empty packet workaround for CBC guessability.^enable the reception of compatibility SSLv2 client hello. the flag will be set to false regardless of its initial value after the first packet received._current tx state`current rx stateaoptional handshake statebhooks for this contextc;lock to use for writing data (including updating the state)d;lock to use for reading data (including updating the state)emlock used during read/write when receiving and sending packet. it is usually nested in a write or read lock.@=Information related to a running context, e.g. current cipherJ%Information about the current context:>f?ghZij[\]^_`aklbcde@ABCDEFGmnHIJopqrstuvKwxyz{|}~b./0123@ABCD !"#$%&'()*+,-./4>f?ghZij[\]^_`aklbcde@ABCDEFGmnHIJopqrstuvKwxy{|}~>f?ghZij[\]^_`aklbcde@ABCDEFGmnHIJopqrstuvKwxyz{|}~& BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone' BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone( BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone1) BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone* BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone:+ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNonemakePacketData\ create a Header and a content bytestring related to a packet this doesn't change any statemarshall packet datajwritePacket transform a packet into marshalled data related to current state and updating state on the go, BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone0JrecvRecord receive a full TLS record (header + data), from the other side..The record is disengaged from the record layerreceive one packet from the context that contains 1 or many messages (many only in case of handshake). if will returns a TLSError if the packet is unexpected or malformedSend one packet to the context1flag to enable SSLv2 compat ClientHello reception TLS context-None01when a new handshake is done, wrap up & clean up.?process a list of handshakes message in the recv state machine.<message possibly sent between ChangeCipherSpec and Finished. . BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone07send client Data after receiving all server data (hello certificateskey).> [certificate]> client key exchange> [cert verify]<onServerHello process the ServerHello message on the client.1) check the version chosen by the server is one allowed by parameters. 2) check that our compression and cipher algorithms are part of the list we sent 3) check extensions received are part of the one we sent 4) process the session parameter to see if the server want to start a new session or can resume 5) process NPN extension 6) if no resume switch to processCertificate SM or in resume switch to expectChangeCipher  / BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone0)Put the server context in handshake mode.Expect a client hello message as parameter. This is useful when the client hello has been already poped from the recv layer to inspect the packet.When the function returns, a new handshake has been succesfully negociated. On any error, a HandshakeFailed exception is raised.handshake protocol ( - receiving, -K sending, [] optional): (no session) (session resumption) <- client hello <- client hello -> server hello -> server hello -> [certificate] -> [server key xchg] -> [cert request] -> hello done <- [certificate] <- client key xchg <- [cert verify]  -change cipher -$ change cipher <- [NPN]  -finish -Z finish -> change cipher <- change cipher -> finish <- finish>receive Client data in handshake until the Finished handshake.v<- [certificate] <- client key xchg <- [cert verify] <- change cipher <- [NPN] <- finish0 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneLsHandshake for a new TLS connection This is to be called at the beginning of a connection, and during renegotiationLLL1 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneN@create a new context using the backend and parameters specified.O"create a new context on an handle.P!create a new context on a socket.MNNBackend abstraction with specific method to interact with the connection type.Parameters of the context.OHandle of the connection.Parameters of the context.PSocket of the connection.Parameters of the context.QRSE>f?ghZij[\]^_`aklbcde@ABCDEFGmnHIJopqrstuvKwxy{|}~MNOPQRS MNOPQRS2 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneTTnotify the context that this side wants to close connection. this is important that it is called before closing the handle, otherwise the session might not be resumable (for version < TLS1.2).&this doesn't actually close the handleUsIf the Next Protocol Negotiation or ALPN extensions have been used, this will return get the protocol agreed upon.VdIf the Server Name Indication extension has been used, return the hostname specified by the client.W[sendData sends a bunch of data. It will automatically chunk data to acceptable packet sizeXkrecvData get data out of Data packet, and automatically renegotiate if a Handshake ClientHello is receivedY/same as recvData but returns a lazy bytestring.TUVWXY LTUVWXYTUVWXY3 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone./0123456789EG! "$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdeLMNOPQRSTfUghVijkWXYZ[lmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~\]_`abcdefghijlmnopqrstuv $%&'*-01234 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneT "! #$%&'()*+-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXY]&'()*+,-./#E !"#$%0123F     G@ABCD$%&'()*+4yz{|}~jk3./012:;<=>?89:;<=>??M567NOPHIQRSK@ABCDEFGfghigiJTLUVWXY,-456789pqrstuvwxHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdelmno "!  BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNoneSZ,All AES ciphers supported ordered from strong to weak. This choice of ciphersuites should satisfy most normal needs. For otherwise strong ciphers we make little distinction between AES128 and AES256, and list each but the weakest of the AES128 ciphers ahead of the corresponding AES256 ciphers.[DThe default ciphersuites + some not recommended last resort ciphers.\list of medium ciphers.]The strongest ciphers supported ciphers supported. For ciphers with PFS, AEAD and SHA2, we list each AES128 variant right after the corresponding AES256 variant. For weaker constructs, we use just the AES256 form.^DHE-RSA cipher suite`8all unencrypted ciphers, do not use on insecure network.a@unencrypted cipher using RSA for key exchange and MD5 for digestbAunencrypted cipher using RSA for key exchange and SHA1 for digestc/RC4 cipher, RSA key exchange and MD5 for digestd0RC4 cipher, RSA key exchange and SHA1 for digeste>AES cipher (128 bit key), RSA key exchange and SHA1 for digestfMAES cipher (128 bit key), DHE key exchanged signed by DSA and SHA1 for digestgMAES cipher (128 bit key), DHE key exchanged signed by RSA and SHA1 for digesth>AES cipher (256 bit key), RSA key exchange and SHA1 for digestiMAES cipher (256 bit key), DHE key exchanged signed by DSA and SHA1 for digestjMAES cipher (256 bit key), DHE key exchanged signed by RSA and SHA1 for digestk@AES cipher (128 bit key), RSA key exchange and SHA256 for digestl@AES cipher (256 bit key), RSA key exchange and SHA256 for digestmaAESGCM cipher (128 bit key), RSA key exchange. The SHA256 digest is used as a PRF, not as a MAC.naAESGCM cipher (256 bit key), RSA key exchange. The SHA384 digest is used as a PRF, not as a MAC.r?3DES cipher (168 bit key), RSA key exchange and SHA1 for digest8Z[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~'Z[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~'Z[\]`^_behklmngjpqfistywxzuv{|}~rcdao8Z[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~4 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez <vincent@snarc.org> experimentalunknownNone'Z[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~56756856956:56;56<5=>5=?5=@ABCABDABEABFABGABHABIABJABKABLABLABMABNABOABPABQABQARSARTARUARVARWARXARYARZARZA[\]^_`abcdefgghijklmnopqrrstuv w w x y z {|}~      !"#$%&'()*++,-./012334567889:;<==>?@ABCDEFGGHIJKLMNOOPQRSTUVWXXYZ[$\$]$^$_$_$`$a$b$c%d%e%f%f%g%h%i%j%k%l%m%n%o%p0q1r1s1t1u1v1w1x2y2z2{2|2}2~55555555555555ABABA[                          !"#!"$!"%&''(())*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abbcdeeffghijjklmnopqrstuvwxyzz{|}}~}5      !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_``abcddeefghijjklmnopqrsttYZ[\uvw]xyz\{|}~\\;z{      !"#$%&&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@A B C D E F G H I J K L M M N B O P Q R!S!T!U!V!W"X"Y"Z"["\"]"^"_$`$a$b$c%d%e%f%g%h%i%j%k%l%m%n%o%d%p%q%r%s%t%u%v%w%x%y%z%{%|%}%~%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%&&''''''(((()))))))))))))))**+++++,,,,,----------------............/////11111112\ tls-1.3.9-Cmr6TOcO8IsLrBGBQadBCB Network.TLSNetwork.TLS.Extra.CipherNetwork.TLS.X509Network.TLS.Util.SerializationNetwork.TLS.Util.ASN1Network.TLS.TypesNetwork.TLS.SessionNetwork.TLS.RNGNetwork.TLS.MeasurementNetwork.TLS.ImportsNetwork.TLS.UtilNetwork.TLS.Extension.ECNetwork.TLS.ErrTNetwork.TLS.Crypto.ECDHNetwork.TLS.Crypto.DHNetwork.TLS.StructNetwork.TLS.HooksNetwork.TLS.WireNetwork.TLS.CryptoNetwork.TLS.MACNetwork.TLS.CredentialsNetwork.TLS.CompressionNetwork.TLS.CipherNetwork.TLS.CapNetwork.TLS.PacketNetwork.TLS.ExtensionNetwork.TLS.Parametersciphersuite_defaultNetwork.TLS.StateNetwork.TLS.Record.StateNetwork.TLS.Handshake.StateNetwork.TLS.Record.TypesNetwork.TLS.Record.DisengageNetwork.TLS.Record.EngageNetwork.TLS.RecordNetwork.TLS.BackendNetwork.TLS.Context.Internal!Network.TLS.Handshake.CertificateNetwork.TLS.Handshake.KeyNetwork.TLS.Handshake.ProcessNetwork.TLS.Handshake.SignatureNetwork.TLS.ReceivingNetwork.TLS.SendingNetwork.TLS.IONetwork.TLS.Handshake.CommonNetwork.TLS.Handshake.ClientNetwork.TLS.Handshake.ServerNetwork.TLS.HandshakeNetwork.TLS.ContextNetwork.TLS.CoreNetwork.TLS.InternalNetwork.TLS.Extra!x509-1.6.5-DPbJUwQSjLW8oXYVMufv8vData.X509.PublicKey PubKeyUnknownPubKeyECPubKeyDH PubKeyDSA PubKeyRSAPubKeyData.X509.PrivateKey PrivKeyDSA PrivKeyRSAPrivKey,x509-validation-1.6.5-Kb5Iojou09a4HzyG2SyVSmData.X509.Validation checkFQHNcheckLeafKeyPurposecheckLeafKeyUsage checkLeafV3checkExhaustivecheckCAConstraintscheckStrictOrdering checkAtTimecheckTimeValidityValidationCheckshookFilterReasonhookValidateNamehookValidateTimehookMatchSubjectIssuerValidationHooksData.X509.Validation.CacheexceptionValidationCacheValidationCacheUnknownValidationCacheDeniedValidationCachePassValidationCacheResultcacheAdd cacheQueryValidationCacheData.X509.Validation.TypesHostNameCertificateUsageCertificateUsageAcceptCertificateUsageRejectCertificateRejectReasonCertificateRejectExpiredCertificateRejectRevokedCertificateRejectUnknownCACertificateRejectOther CompressionIDCipherID SessionDatasessionVersion sessionCipher sessionSecret SessionIDVersionSSL2SSL3TLS10TLS11TLS12SessionManager sessionResumesessionEstablishsessionInvalidatenoSessionManager Measurement nbHandshakes bytesReceived bytesSentBytesDHParams HandshakeAlertDescription CloseNotifyUnexpectedMessage BadRecordMacDecryptionFailedRecordOverflowDecompressionFailureHandshakeFailureBadCertificateUnsupportedCertificateCertificateRevokedCertificateExpiredCertificateUnknownIllegalParameter UnknownCa AccessDenied DecodeError DecryptErrorExportRestrictionProtocolVersionInsufficientSecurity InternalErrorInappropriateFallback UserCanceledNoRenegotiationUnsupportedExtensionCertificateUnobtainableUnrecognizedNameBadCertificateStatusResponseBadCertificateHashValue ClientRandomunClientRandom ServerRandomunServerRandomHeader TLSException TerminatedHandshakeFailedConnectionNotEstablishedTLSError Error_MiscError_ProtocolError_CertificateError_HandshakePolicy Error_EOF Error_PacketError_Packet_unexpectedError_Packet_Parsing ProtocolTypeProtocolType_ChangeCipherSpecProtocolType_AlertProtocolType_HandshakeProtocolType_AppData ProtocolType_DeprecatedHandshakeHashAndSignatureAlgorithmSignatureAlgorithmSignatureAnonymous SignatureRSA SignatureDSSSignatureECDSASignatureOther HashAlgorithmHashNoneHashMD5HashSHA1 HashSHA224 HashSHA256 HashSHA384 HashSHA512 HashOtherCertificateTypeCertificateType_RSA_SignCertificateType_DSS_SignCertificateType_RSA_Fixed_DHCertificateType_DSS_Fixed_DH CertificateType_RSA_Ephemeral_DH CertificateType_DSS_Ephemeral_DHCertificateType_fortezza_dmsCertificateType_UnknownHookshookRecvHandshakehookRecvCertificates hookLoggingLoggingloggingPacketSentloggingPacketRecv loggingIOSent loggingIORecvHashMD5SHA1SHA224SHA256SHA384SHA512SHA1_MD5KxErrorRSAError KxUnsupported Credentials CredentialcredentialLoadX509credentialLoadX509FromMemorycredentialLoadX509Chain!credentialLoadX509ChainFromMemoryNullCompression Compression CompressionCcompressionCIDcompressionCDeflatecompressionCInflate compressionIDcompressionDeflatecompressionInflatecompressionIntersectIDnullCompressionCiphercipherID cipherName cipherHash cipherBulkcipherKeyExchange cipherMinVer cipherPRFHashBulkbulkName bulkKeySize bulkIVSizebulkExplicitIVbulkAuthTagLen bulkBlockSizebulkFCipherKeyExchangeTypeCipherKeyExchange_RSACipherKeyExchange_DH_AnonCipherKeyExchange_DHE_RSACipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_RSACipherKeyExchange_DHE_DSSCipherKeyExchange_DH_DSSCipherKeyExchange_DH_RSACipherKeyExchange_ECDH_ECDSACipherKeyExchange_ECDH_RSACipherKeyExchange_ECDHE_ECDSA BulkFunctions BulkBlockF BulkStreamF BulkAeadF BulkDirection BulkEncrypt BulkDecryptBulkAEAD BulkBlock BulkStream BulkStateBulkStateStreamBulkStateBlock BulkStateAEADBulkStateUninitializedBulkAdditionalData BulkNonceBulkIVBulkKeybulkInithasMAC hasRecordIVcipherKeyBlockSizecipherAllowedForVersioncipherExchangeNeedMoreDataMaxFragmentEnumMaxFragment512MaxFragment1024MaxFragment2048MaxFragment4096 ServerHooksonClientCertificateonUnverifiedClientCertonCipherChoosingonServerNameIndicationonSuggestNextProtocolsonNewHandshakeonALPNClientSuggest ClientHooksonCertificateRequestonNPNServerSuggestonServerCertificate onSuggestALPNSharedsharedCredentialssharedSessionManager sharedCAStoresharedValidationCache SupportedsupportedVersionssupportedCipherssupportedCompressionssupportedHashSignaturessupportedSecureRenegotiation%supportedClientInitiatedRenegotiationsupportedSessionsupportedFallbackScsvsupportedEmptyPacket ServerParamsserverWantClientCertserverCACertificatesserverDHEParams serverShared serverHooksserverSupported serverDebug ClientParamsclientUseMaxFragmentLengthclientServerIdentificationclientUseServerNameIndicationclientWantSessionResume clientShared clientHooksclientSupported clientDebug DebugParams debugSeeddebugPrintSeeddefaultParamsClient HasBackendinitializeBackend getBackendBackend backendFlush backendClose backendSend backendRecvContext ctxConnection Information infoVersion infoCipherinfoCompressioninfoMasterSecretinfoClientRandominfoServerRandom contextFlush contextClosecontextGetInformationcontextModifyHooks handshake TLSParams contextNewcontextNewOnHandlecontextNewOnSocketcontextHookSetHandshakeRecvcontextHookSetCertificateRecvcontextHookSetLoggingbyegetNegotiatedProtocol getClientSNIsendDatarecvData recvData'ciphersuite_allciphersuite_mediumciphersuite_strongciphersuite_dhe_rsaciphersuite_dhe_dssciphersuite_unencryptedcipher_null_MD5cipher_null_SHA1cipher_RC4_128_MD5cipher_RC4_128_SHA1cipher_AES128_SHA1cipher_DHE_DSS_AES128_SHA1cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA1cipher_AES256_SHA1cipher_DHE_DSS_AES256_SHA1cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA1cipher_AES128_SHA256cipher_AES256_SHA256cipher_AES128GCM_SHA256cipher_AES256GCM_SHA384cipher_DHE_DSS_RC4_SHA1cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128_SHA256cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256_SHA256cipher_RSA_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA1cipher_DHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384 cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHAcipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHAcipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA!cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256!cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384#cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256#cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHA384#cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128GCM_SHA256#cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256GCM_SHA384!cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256!cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384isNullCertificateChaingetCertificateChainLeafwrapCertificateChecks Data.X509getCertificateSignedCertificateData.X509.CertificateChainCertificateChainData.X509.Cert Certificate certVersion certSerialcertSignatureAlg certIssuerDN certValidity certSubjectDN certPubKeycertExtensions'x509-store-1.6.2-IT3sIL5efjz8Ud2V0RbCHkData.X509.CertificateStoreCertificateStorevalidateDefault FailedReason ServiceID lengthBytes&cryptonite-0.21-ARqf0ltpjwx2bdn2Fx5x7sCrypto.Number.Serializei2ospOf_i2ospos2ipdecodeASN1ObjectencodeASN1Object DirectionRoleTxRx ClientRole ServerRole invertRoleStateRNG withTLSRNG newStateRNG$fShowStateRNG Crypto.RandomseedFromInteger seedToIntegerseedNewSeedCrypto.Random.Types MonadRandomgetRandomBytesnewMeasurementaddBytesReceived addBytesSentresetBytesCountersincrementNbHandshakes showBytesHexbaseGHC.Base Applicativepure<*>*><*Monoidmemptymappendmconcat Data.Functor<$>and'&&!bytesEqsubtakelast partition3 partition6fromJust fmapEithercatchException toCurveName fromCurveNameCrypto.PubKey.ECC.Types CurveName SEC_p112r1 SEC_p112r2 SEC_p128r1 SEC_p128r2 SEC_p160k1 SEC_p160r1 SEC_p160r2 SEC_p192k1 SEC_p192r1 SEC_p224k1 SEC_p224r1 SEC_p256k1 SEC_p256r1 SEC_p384r1 SEC_p521r1 SEC_t113r1 SEC_t113r2 SEC_t131r1 SEC_t131r2 SEC_t163k1 SEC_t163r1 SEC_t163r2 SEC_t193r1 SEC_t193r2 SEC_t233k1 SEC_t233r1 SEC_t239k1 SEC_t283k1 SEC_t283r1 SEC_t409k1 SEC_t409r1 SEC_t571k1 SEC_t571r1ErrTrunErrT mtl-2.2.1-6qsR1PHUy5lL47Hpoa4jCMControl.Monad.Error.Class MonadError throwError catchErrortransformers-0.5.2.0Control.Monad.Trans.ErrorErrorstrMsgnoMsgECDHKey ECDHParams ECDHPrivate ECDHPublic ecdhPublic ecdhPrivate ecdhParamsecdhGenerateKeyPair ecdhGetShared ecdhUnwrapecdhUnwrapPublic pointSizeDHKey DHPrivateDHPublicdhPublic dhPrivatedhParamsdhGenerateKeyPair dhGetShareddhUnwrap dhParamsGetP dhParamsGetGdhUnwrapPublic EnumSafe16fromEnumSafe16 toEnumSafe16 EnumSafe8 fromEnumSafe8 toEnumSafe8 TypeValuable valOfType valToType ClientHello ServerHello Certificates HelloRequestServerHelloDone ClientKeyXchg ServerKeyXchg CertRequest CertVerifyFinishedHsNextProtocolNegotiationDeprecatedRecordClientKeyXchgAlgorithmDataCKX_RSACKX_DHCKX_ECDHServerKeyXchgAlgorithmData SKX_DH_Anon SKX_DHE_DSS SKX_DHE_RSA SKX_ECDHE_RSASKX_ECDHE_ECDSASKX_RSA SKX_DH_DSS SKX_DH_RSA SKX_Unparsed SKX_UnknownServerRSAParams rsa_modulus rsa_exponentServerECDHParamsServerDHParamsserverDHParams_pserverDHParams_gserverDHParams_yBigNum HandshakeTypeHandshakeType_HelloRequestHandshakeType_ClientHelloHandshakeType_ServerHelloHandshakeType_CertificateHandshakeType_ServerKeyXchgHandshakeType_CertRequestHandshakeType_ServerHelloDoneHandshakeType_CertVerifyHandshakeType_ClientKeyXchgHandshakeType_FinishedHandshakeType_NPN AlertLevelAlertLevel_WarningAlertLevel_Fatal ExtensionRaw ExtensionID FinishedDataSessionPacketAlertChangeCipherSpecAppDataDigitallySigned Signature CipherDatacipherDataContent cipherDataMACcipherDataPadding CipherType CipherStream CipherBlock CipherAEAD ConnectionEndConnectionServerConnectionClientconstrRandom32 serverRandom clientRandombigNumToIntegerbigNumFromIntegerserverDHParamsFromserverDHParamsToParamsserverDHParamsToPublic packetTypetypeOfHandshake numericalVerverOfNum $fTypeValuableSignatureAlgorithm$fTypeValuableHashAlgorithm$fTypeValuableCertificateType$fTypeValuableAlertDescription$fTypeValuableAlertLevel$fTypeValuableHandshakeType$fTypeValuableProtocolType$fTypeValuableCipherType$fTypeValuableConnectionEnd$fShowExtensionRaw$fExceptionTLSException$fExceptionTLSErrorData.X509.DistinguishedNameDistinguishedNamedefaultLogging defaultHooks$fDefaultHooks$fDefaultLogging GetResultGotError GotPartial GotSuccessGotSuccessRemainingGetContinuationrunGet runGetErr runGetMaybetryGet getWords8 getWord16 getWords16 getWord24 getOpaque8 getOpaque16 getOpaque24 getInteger16 getBigNum16getList processBytes putWords8 putWord16 putWord32 putWords16 putWord24putBytes putOpaque8 putOpaque16 putOpaque24 putInteger16 putBigNum16 encodeWord16 encodeWord32 encodeWord64%cereal-0.5.4.0-LXuGw964IxKFJaPTyZmzLsData.Serialize.GetgetWord8getBytesisEmpty remainingGetData.Serialize.PutputWord8runPutPutHashCtx ContextSimple HashContextHashContextSSL PrivateKey PublicKeyhashInit hashUpdate hashUpdateSSL hashFinalhashhashNamehashDigestSize hashBlockSizegeneralizeRSAError kxEncrypt kxDecryptkxVerifykxSign rsaSignHash rsaVerifyHashnoHash$fShowHashContextprf_TLSHMACmacSSLhmachmacIterprf_SHA1prf_MD5 prf_MD5SHA1 prf_SHA256 credentialsListSigningAlgorithmscredentialsFindForSigningcredentialsFindForDecryptingcredentialCanDecryptcredentialCanSigngetSignatureAlg$fMonoidCredentials$fCompressionCNullCompression$fEqCompression$fShowCompression $fEqCipher $fShowCipher$fEqBulk $fShowBulk$fShowBulkStatehasHelloExtensionshasExplicitBlockIVcParamsVersioncParamsKeyXchgTypecParamsSupportNPN&decodeReallyServerKeyXchgAlgorithmDatagetPRFPRF CurrentParams getVersion putVersion getHeaderType putHeaderTypegetHandshakeType decodeHeaderdecodeDeprecatedHeaderLengthdecodeDeprecatedHeader encodeHeaderencodeHeaderNoVer decodeAlert decodeAlerts encodeAlertsdecodeHandshakeRecorddecodeHandshakedecodeDeprecatedHandshakedecodeHelloRequestdecodeClientHellodecodeServerHellodecodeServerHelloDonedecodeCertificatesdecodeFinisheddecodeNextProtocolNegotiationdecodeCertRequestdecodeCertVerifydecodeClientKeyXchgdecodeServerKeyXchg_DHdecodeServerKeyXchg_RSA decodeServerKeyXchgAlgorithmDatadecodeServerKeyXchgencodeHandshakeencodeHandshakesencodeHandshakeHeaderencodeHandshakeContent getRandom32getServerRandom32getClientRandom32 putRandom32putClientRandom32putServerRandom32 getSession putSession getExtensions putExtension putExtensionsgetSignatureHashAlgorithmputSignatureHashAlgorithmgetServerDHParamsputServerDHParamsgetServerECDHParamsputServerECDHParamsgetDigitallySignedputDigitallySigneddecodeChangeCipherSpecencodeChangeCipherSpecdecodePreMasterSecretencodePreMasterSecretgenerateMasterSecret_SSLgenerateMasterSecret_TLSgenerateMasterSecretgenerateKeyBlock_TLSgenerateKeyBlock_SSLgenerateKeyBlockgenerateFinished_TLSgenerateFinished_SSLgenerateClientFinishedgenerateServerFinishedgenerateCertificateVerify_SSLencodeSignedDHParamsencodeSignedECDHParams#ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiationNextProtocolNegotiationSecureRenegotiationMaxFragmentLength ServerName ExtensionsupportedExtensionsSignatureAlgorithms HeartBeatModeHeartBeat_PeerAllowedToSendHeartBeat_PeerNotAllowedToSend HeartBeat SessionTicket EcPointFormatEcPointFormat_Uncompressed'EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_prime'EcPointFormat_AnsiX962_compressed_char2EcPointFormatsSupportedBrainPoolCurveBrainPoolP512R1BrainPoolP384R1BrainPoolP256R1 NamedCurveSEC BrainPool*NamedCurve_arbitrary_explicit_prime_curves*NamedCurve_arbitrary_explicit_char2_curvesEllipticCurvesSupportedServerNameTypeServerNameHostNameServerNameOther extensionIDextensionDecodeextensionEncodeextensionID_ServerNameextensionID_MaxFragmentLength extensionID_ClientCertificateUrlextensionID_TrustedCAKeysextensionID_TruncatedHMACextensionID_StatusRequestextensionID_UserMappingextensionID_ClientAuthzextensionID_ServerAuthzextensionID_CertTypeextensionID_EllipticCurvesextensionID_EcPointFormatsextensionID_SRPextensionID_SignatureAlgorithmsextensionID_SRTPextensionID_Heartbeat/extensionID_ApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiationextensionID_StatusRequestv2&extensionID_SignedCertificateTimestamp!extensionID_ClientCertificateType!extensionID_ServerCertificateTypeextensionID_PaddingextensionID_EncryptThenMAC extensionID_ExtendedMasterSecretextensionID_SessionTicket#extensionID_NextProtocolNegotiationextensionID_SecureRenegotiationdefinedExtensionsavailableEllipticCurves$fExtensionSignatureAlgorithms$fExtensionHeartBeat$fEnumSafe8HeartBeatMode$fExtensionSessionTicket"$fExtensionEcPointFormatsSupported$fEnumSafe8EcPointFormat"$fExtensionEllipticCurvesSupported$fEnumSafe16NamedCurve.$fExtensionApplicationLayerProtocolNegotiation"$fExtensionNextProtocolNegotiation$fExtensionSecureRenegotiation$fExtensionMaxFragmentLength$fExtensionServerNameNothingghc-prim GHC.TypesTrueFalse CommonParamsdefaultDebugParamsdefaultParamsServerdefaultSupporteddefaultClientHooksdefaultServerHooks$fDefaultServerHooks$fShowServerHooks$fDefaultClientHooks$fShowClientHooks$fDefaultShared $fShowShared$fDefaultSupported$fDefaultServerParams$fDefaultDebugParams$fShowDebugParamsTLSStrunTLSStTLSState stSessionstSessionResumingstSecureRenegotiationstClientVerifiedDatastServerVerifiedDatastExtensionNPNstExtensionALPNstHandshakeRecordContstNegotiatedProtocolstServerNextProtocolSuggeststClientALPNSuggeststClientEllipticCurveSuggeststClientEcPointFormatSuggeststClientCertificateChain stClientSNI stRandomGen stVersionstClientContext runTLSState newTLSStateupdateVerifiedDatafinishHandshakeTypeMaterialfinishHandshakeMaterialcertVerifyHandshakeTypeMaterialcertVerifyHandshakeMaterial setSessionisSessionResuming setVersionsetVersionIfUnsetgetVersionWithDefaultsetSecureRenegotiationgetSecureRenegotiationsetExtensionNPNgetExtensionNPNsetExtensionALPNgetExtensionALPNsetNegotiatedProtocolsetServerNextProtocolSuggestgetServerNextProtocolSuggestsetClientALPNSuggestgetClientALPNSuggestsetClientEllipticCurveSuggestgetClientEllipticCurveSuggestsetClientEcPointFormatSuggestgetClientEcPointFormatSuggestsetClientCertificateChaingetClientCertificateChain setClientSNIgetVerifiedDataisClientContext genRandomwithRNG$fMonadStateTLSStateTLSStRecordM runRecordM RecordStatestCipher stCompression stCryptState stMacStateMacState msSequence CryptStatecstKeycstIV cstMacSecretgetRecordVersionnewRecordStateincrRecordState setRecordIVwithCompression computeDigest makeDigestgetBulkgetMacSequence$fMonadErrorTLSErrorRecordM$fMonadStateRecordStateRecordM$fFunctorRecordM$fMonadRecordM$fApplicativeRecordMhstClientCertRequesthstClientCertSenthstCertReqSentsetMasterSecretFromPresetMasterSecret HandshakeM runHandshakeMClientCertRequestDataHandshakeStatehstClientVersionhstClientRandomhstServerRandomhstMasterSecret hstKeyStatehstServerDHParams hstDHPrivatehstServerECDHParamshstECDHPrivatehstHandshakeDigesthstHandshakeMessageshstClientCertChainhstPendingTxStatehstPendingRxStatehstPendingCipherhstPendingCompressionHandshakeKeyStatehksRemotePublicKeyhksLocalPrivateKeynewEmptyHandshake runHandshake setPublicKey setPrivateKeygetRemotePublicKeygetLocalPrivateKeysetServerDHParamssetServerECDHParamssetCertReqSentgetCertReqSentsetClientCertSentgetClientCertSentsetClientCertChaingetClientCertChainsetClientCertRequestgetClientCertRequestgetPendingCipheraddHandshakeMessagegetHandshakeMessagesupdateHandshakeDigestgetHandshakeDigestcomputeKeyBlocksetServerHelloParametersgetHash$$fMonadStateHandshakeStateHandshakeMRecordfragmentCompressfragmentCipherfragmentUncipherfragmentUncompress recordToRaw rawToRecordrecordToHeader Ciphertext Compressed PlaintextFragmentfragmentGetBytesfragmentPlaintextfragmentCiphertextonRecordFragment fragmentMapdisengageRecorduncompressRecord decryptRecord getCipherData decryptData engageRecordcompressRecord encryptRecordencryptContent encryptBlock encryptStream encryptAead getCryptStatesafeRecv$fHasBackendHandle$fHasBackendSocket$fHasBackendBackend ctxCiphersctxEOF_ctxEstablished_ctxNeedEmptyPacketctxSSLv2ClientHello ctxTxState ctxRxState ctxHandshakectxHooks ctxLockWrite ctxLockRead ctxLockState ctxSupported ctxSharedctxStatectxMeasurementctxDoHandshakectxDoHandshakeWith updateMeasure withMeasure contextSend contextRecvctxEOFctxHasSSLv2ClientHelloctxDisableSSLv2ClientHellosetEOFctxEstablished ctxWithHookssetEstablishedwithLog throwCorefailOnEitherError usingState usingState_ usingHState getHState runTxState runRxState getStateRNG withReadLock withWriteLock withRWLock withStateLockcertificateRejectedrejectOnException encryptRSA signPrivate decryptRSA verifyPublic generateDHE generateECDHEprocessHandshakeprocessClientKeyXchgprocessClientFinishedstartHandshakeCertVerifyDatacertificateVerifyCheckcertificateVerifyCreategetHashAndASN1%prepareCertificateVerifySignatureDatasignatureHashDatasignatureCreatesignatureVerifysignatureVerifyWithHashDescrdigitallySignParamsdigitallySignDHParamsdigitallySignECDHParamsdigitallySignDHParamsVerifydigitallySignECDHParamsVerifywithClientAndServerRandom processPacketswitchRxEncryption makeRecord encodeRecord writePacket prepareRecordswitchTxEncryption recvRecord recvPacket sendPacket checkValid readExacthandshakeTerminateonRecvStateHandshake RecvState RecvStateNextRecvStateHandshake RecvStateDonehandshakeFailed errorToAlert unexpected newSessionsendChangeCipherAndFinishrecvChangeCipherAndFinishrecvPacketHandshake runRecvStategetSessionDataextensionLookupsendClientData onServerHellohandshakeClientWithhandshakeClientprocessServerExtensionthrowMiscErrorOnExceptionprocessCertificateexpectChangeCipher expectFinishprocessServerKeyExchangeprocessCertificateRequestprocessServerHelloDonehandshakeServerWithrecvClientDatahandshakeServer doHandshakefindHighestVersionFromgetTLSCommonParams getTLSRole getCiphersdoHandshakeWith$fTLSParamsServerParams$fTLSParamsClientParams aes128cbc aes256cbc aes128gcm aes256gcmnoFailmakeIV_ tripledes_ede tripledes_ivrc4 bulk_nullbulk_rc4 bulk_aes128bulk_aes128gcmbulk_aes256gcm bulk_aes256bulk_tripledes_ede