нУЁh&0⌡G╔ !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТУЖВЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТУЖВЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТУЖВЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёєю BSD-styleKazu Yamamoto experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred ╙╔ії╗/9876543210╘╙ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred,╚╛ґў╞ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred║е╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТУЖВЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТУЖВЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred~=tlsConnection IO backend?tls,Flush the connection sending buffer, if any.@tlsClose the connection.Atls)Send a bytestring through the connection.Btls6Receive specified number of bytes from the connection. :;<=>?@AB BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredіCtls'record some data about this connection.Etls$number of handshakes on this contextFtls#bytes received since last handshakeGtlsbytes sent since last handshake CDEFGУЖВЬЫ Safe-Inferredяч ЗШЭЩЧЪ─│┌┐ Safe-Inferred└H┘I├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░ BSD-styleKazu Yamamoto experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred≈Jtls▌2048 bits finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral parameters defined in RFC 7919. The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength is 103 bits.Ktls▌3072 bits finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral parameters defined in RFC 7919. The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength is 125 bits.Ltls▌4096 bits finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral parameters defined in RFC 7919. The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength is 150 bits.Mtls▌6144 bits finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral parameters defined in RFC 7919. The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength is 175 bits.Ntls▌8192 bits finite field Diffie-Hellman ephemeral parameters defined in RFC 7919. The estimated symmetric-equivalent strength is 192 bits.JKLMNJKLMN BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredWOtls=Hold both client and server traffic secrets at the same step.PtlsшA server traffic secret, typed with a parameter indicating a step in the TLS key schedule.RtlsшA client traffic secret, typed with a parameter indicating a step in the TLS key schedule.Ttls4Phantom type indicating application traffic secrets.Utls2Phantom type indicating handshake traffic secrets.Vtls-Phantom type indicating early traffic secret.▒tls Direction▓tlsRoleWtlsCompression identificationXtlsCipher identification⌠tls(Certificate request context for TLS 1.3.ZtlsSome session flags[tls+Session created with Extended Master Secret\tlsSession data to resumehtlsA session IDitlsVersions known to TLSдSSL2 is just defined, but this version is and will not be supported.а.■∙O√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·PQRS÷═║╒ёTUV▒є╔▓іїWXY╗╘╙╚╛⌠Z[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnoґў╞ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredКptlsA session managerrtlsаused on server side to decide whether to resume a client session.stlsъused on server side to decide whether to resume a client session for TLS 1.3 0RTT. For a given h%, the implementation must return its \( only once and must not return the same \ after the call.ttls#used when a session is established.utls#used when a session is invalidated.vtls"The session manager to do nothing.pqrstuv BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferredиэ[╟tls0This is the default compression which is a NOOP.wtlsаevery compression need to be wrapped in this, to fit in structureytls>supported compression algorithms need to be part of this class╠tls+return the associated ID for this algorithm╡tlsЗdeflate (compress) a bytestring using a compression context and return the result along with the new compression context.ЁtlsВinflate (decompress) a bytestring using a compression context and return the result along the new compression context.Єtls©intersect a list of ids commonly given by the other side with a list of compression the function keeps the list of compression in order, to be able to find quickly the prefered compression.}tlsdefault null compression W╟wxyz{|╠╡ЁЄ} BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferredв╣І Safe-Inferredэ КЇtlsуAn opaque newtype wrapper to prevent from poking inside content that has been saved.╦tlsThis is a strict version of &&.╧tls⌠verify that 2 bytestrings are equals. it's a non lazy version, that will compare every bytes. arguments with different length will bail out early╨tlsSave the content of an ╩ to restore it later.╪tlsRestore the content of an ╩о to a previous saved value and return the content that has just been replaced.ЇҐЎ©юа╦╧бцдеф╨╪ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"гtlsэAttempt to decode a bytestring representing an DER ASN.1 serialized object into the object.хtls7Encode an ASN.1 Object to the DER serialized bytestringгх Safe-Inferred"Hийк BSD-styleKazu Yamamoto experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"Ёлмнопярстуж Safe-Inferredивэ$p┴tlsDigest size in bytes.вtlsпTest the RSASSA-PKCS1 length condition described in RFC 8017 section 9.2, i.e. emLen >= tLen + 11. Lengths are in bytes.ьtlsпTest the RSASSA-PSS length condition described in RFC 8017 section 9.1.1, i.e. emBits >= 8hLen + 8sLen + 9. Lengths are in bits.ыtls+(for the md5 context, for the sha1 context)Х ╔і╗ї/9876543201╘╙└H┘I├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░лмнопярстужзшэщчъЮАБЦД~└┐┌│─┘├┤┬ЕФГХИЙКЛыМНО┴ПЯРвьСТУ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred6,G▐tlsбdeprecated alert, should never be sent by compliant implementationґtls#The raw content of a TLS extension.╞tlsIdentifier of a TLS extension.ІtlsюTLS Exceptions related to bad user usage or asynchronous errorsЇtlsгEarly termination exception with the reason and the error associated╦tls(Handshake failed for the reason attached╧tlsЙUsage error when the connection has not been established and the user is trying to send or receive data╨tls5TLSError that might be returned through the TLS stack╩tlsmainly for instance of ErrorЎtlshandshake policy failed.Бtls,Some of the IANA registered code points for Бв are not currently supported by the library. Nor should they be, they're are either unwise, obsolete or both. There's no point in conveying these to the user in the client certificate request callback. The request callback will be filtered to exclude unsupported values. If the user cannot find a certificate for a supported code point, we'll go ahead without a client certificate and hope for the best, unless the user's callback decides to throw an exception.ЦtlsTLS10 and up, RFC5246ДtlsTLS10 and up, RFC5246ЕtlsTLS10 and up, RFC8422ФtlsTLS13 and up, syntheticГtls╘TLS13 and up, synthetic | None of the below will ever be presented to the callback. Any future public key algorithms valid for client certificates go above this line.ЖtlsХLast supported certificate type, no 'CertificateType that compares greater than this one (based on the ҐЫ instance, not on the wire code point) will be reported to the application via the client certificate request callback.шВ\]^_`abcdefghijklmnoЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─┼│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠▀⌡▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ °²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛╡ЁЄґў╞╣ІЇ╟╦╠╡╧ЁЄ╣╨╩╪ҐЎІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгх©юаийклмнопярстужвьзшэщчъыЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОбцдефгхийклмЖнопярстуж BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred.U вьызшэщчъЮАПБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТУ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred/⌡Жtls░For now we ignore the version, but perhaps some day the PRF will depend not only on the cipher PRF algorithm, but also on the protocol version.ВЬЫЗШЭЖ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferredиэ0▀ЯtlsCipher algorithmїtlsCheck if a specific Я2 is allowed to be used with the version specifiedюX~└┐┌│─┘ЯРТСУЖВЬЫЗШ┌ЭЩЧЪ─│┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred3C╗tlsаHandshake information generated for traffic at application level.╙tls?Handshake information generated for traffic at handshake level.╛tls;Handshake information generated for traffic at 0-RTT level.ўtlsЕID of the application-level protocol negotiated between client and server. See values listed in the Йhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml#alpn-protocol-ids IANA registry.ЩЧЪ─ │ ┌ ┐ ╗╘╙╚╛ґў BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred@Х╞tlsбAll AES and ChaCha20-Poly1305 ciphers supported ordered from strong to weak. This choice of ciphersuites should satisfy most normal needs. For otherwise strong ciphers we make little distinction between AES128 and AES256, and list each but the weakest of the AES128 ciphers ahead of the corresponding AES256 ciphers.║AEAD ciphers with equivalent security properties are ordered based on CPU hardware-acceleration support. If this dynamic runtime behavior is not desired, use ╟ instead.╟tlsSame as ╞ю, but using deterministic preference not influenced by the CPU.╠tlsдThe default ciphersuites + some not recommended last resort ciphers.║AEAD ciphers with equivalent security properties are ordered based on CPU hardware-acceleration support. If this dynamic runtime behavior is not desired, use ╡ instead.╡tlsSame as ╠ю, but using deterministic preference not influenced by the CPU.Ёtlslist of medium ciphers.ЄtlsьThe strongest ciphers supported. For ciphers with PFS, AEAD and SHA2, we list each AES128 variant after the corresponding AES256 and ChaCha20-Poly1305 variants. For weaker constructs, we use just the AES256 form.║AEAD ciphers with equivalent security properties are ordered based on CPU hardware-acceleration support. If this dynamic runtime behavior is not desired, use ╣ instead.╣tlsSame as Єю, but using deterministic preference not influenced by the CPU.ІtlsЩDHE-RSA cipher suite. This only includes ciphers bound specifically to DHE-RSA so TLS 1.3 ciphers must be added separately.╦tls8all unencrypted ciphers, do not use on insecure network.╧tlsюunencrypted cipher using RSA for key exchange and MD5 for digest╨tlsаunencrypted cipher using RSA for key exchange and SHA1 for digest╩tls/RC4 cipher, RSA key exchange and MD5 for digest╪tls0RC4 cipher, RSA key exchange and SHA1 for digestҐtls?3DES cipher (168 bit key), RSA key exchange and SHA1 for digestЎtls>AES cipher (128 bit key), RSA key exchange and SHA1 for digest©tlsмAES cipher (128 bit key), DHE key exchanged signed by DSA and SHA1 for digestюtlsмAES cipher (128 bit key), DHE key exchanged signed by RSA and SHA1 for digestаtls>AES cipher (256 bit key), RSA key exchange and SHA1 for digestбtlsмAES cipher (256 bit key), DHE key exchanged signed by DSA and SHA1 for digestцtlsмAES cipher (256 bit key), DHE key exchanged signed by RSA and SHA1 for digestдtlsюAES cipher (128 bit key), RSA key exchange and SHA256 for digestеtlsюAES cipher (256 bit key), RSA key exchange and SHA256 for digestиtlsАAESCCM cipher (128 bit key), RSA key exchange. The SHA256 digest is used as a PRF, not as a MAC.йtlsБAESCCM8 cipher (128 bit key), RSA key exchange. The SHA256 digest is used as a PRF, not as a MAC.кtlsАAESGCM cipher (128 bit key), RSA key exchange. The SHA256 digest is used as a PRF, not as a MAC.лtlsАAESCCM cipher (256 bit key), RSA key exchange. The SHA256 digest is used as a PRF, not as a MAC.мtlsБAESCCM8 cipher (256 bit key), RSA key exchange. The SHA256 digest is used as a PRF, not as a MAC.нtlsАAESGCM cipher (256 bit key), RSA key exchange. The SHA384 digest is used as a PRF, not as a MAC.>╞╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛ>╞╟╠╡ЁЄ╣╦ІЇ╨Ўадеийклмнюцгх©бопярствКЛАъЮБущчЦДЕФГХИЙжьызшэҐ╩╪╧ф BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredBIцJKLMN╞╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredC4.└ ┘ ├ ┤ ┬ ┴ ┼ ▀ ▄ █ ▌ ▐ ░ ▒ ▓ ⌠ ■ ∙ √ ≈ ≤ ≥ ⌡ ° ² · ÷ ═ ║ ╒ ё є ╔ і ї ╗ ╘ ╙ ╚ ╛ ґ ў ╞ ╟ ╠ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"F=╡ tlscurrent protocol versionЁ tlscurrent key exchange typeЄ tls$Decode a list CA distinguished names╣ tls%Encode a list of distinguished names.І tls·in certain cases, we haven't manage to decode ServerKeyExchange properly, because the decoding was too eager and the cipher wasn't been set yet. we keep the Server Key Exchange in it unparsed format, and this function is able to really decode the server key xchange if it's unparsed.Ї tlsФThe TLS12 PRF is cipher specific, and some TLS12 algorithms use SHA384 instead of the default SHA256..╦ ╧ ╡ Ё ╨ ╩ ╪ Ґ Ў © ю а б ц д е ф Є г х и ╣ й к л м н о п я р с т у ж в І ь ы з ш э щ ч ъ Ю BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredдеH*МtlsTLS encryption level.НtlsUnprotected trafficОtls(Protected with master secret (TLS < 1.3)Пtls-Protected with early traffic secret (TLS 1.3)Яtls1Protected with handshake traffic secret (TLS 1.3)Рtls3Protected with application traffic secret (TLS 1.3)'А Б Ц Д Е Ф Г Х И Й К МПЯРНОЛ М Н О П Я Р С Т У Ж В Ь Ы З Ш Э Щ Ч Ъ ─ │ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredK"┌ tlsRepresent a TLS record.┐ tlsьturn a plaintext record into a compressed record using the compression function supplied└ tlsтturn a compressed record into a ciphertext record using the cipher function supplied┘ tlsьturn a ciphertext fragment into a compressed fragment using the cipher function supplied├ tlsчturn a compressed fragment into a plaintext fragment using the decompression function supplied┤ tls&turn a record into an header and bytes┬ tls*turn a header and a fragment into a record┴ tlsturn a record into a headerЄ╣цдефгхс┼ ▀ ▄ █ ▌ ┌ ▐ ░ ▒ ▓ ⌠ ┐ └ ┘ ├ ┤ ┬ ┴ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredKц■ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredбL1∙ ! BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredL²А Б Ц Д Е Ф Г Х И Ы З Э ┼ ▀ ▄ █ ▌ ┌ ▐ ░ ▓ ┤ ┬ ┴ ■ ∙ " Safe-Inferred"LЫ√ ≈ ≤ ≥ ⌡ ° ² # BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"бMw· ÷ ═ ║ ╒ $ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"дея^6Сtls5Type to show which handshake mode is used in TLS 1.3.ТtlsFull handshake is used.Уtls0Full handshake is used with hello retry request.Жtls!Server authentication is skipped.Вtls8Server authentication is skipped and early data is sent.ё tlsґWhen we receive a CertificateRequest from a server, a just-in-time callback is issued to the application to obtain a suitable certificate. Somewhat unfortunately, the callback parameters don't abstract away the details of the TLS 1.2 Certificate Request message, which combines the legacy certificate_types and new supported_signature_algorithms& parameters is a rather subtle way.°TLS 1.2 also (again unfortunately, in the opinion of the author of this comment) overloads the signature algorithms parameter to constrain not only the algorithms used in TLS, but also the algorithms used by issuing CAs in the X.509 chain. Best practice is to NOT treat such that restriction as a MUST, but rather take it as merely a preference, when a choice exists. If the best chain available does not match the provided signature algorithm list, go ahead and use it anyway, it will probably work, and the server may not even care about the issuer CAs at all, it may be doing DANE or have explicit mappings for the client's public key, ...The TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest message, drops certificate_types and no longer overloads supported_signature_algorithmsИ to cover X.509. It also includes a new opaque context token that the client must echo back, which makes certain client authentication replay attacks more difficult. We will store that context separately, it does not need to be presented in the user callback. The certificate signature algorithms preferred by the peer are now in the separate signature_algorithms_certП extension, but we cannot report these to the application callback without an API change. The good news is that filtering the X.509 signature types is generally unnecessary, unwise and difficult. So we just ignore this extension.⌡As a result, the information we provide to the callback is no longer a verbatim copy of the certificate request payload. In the case of TLS 1.3 The Б6 list is synthetically generated from the server's signature_algorithms extension, and the signature_algorithms_certs extension is ignored.Since the original TLS 1.2 Бї has no provision for the newer certificate types that have appeared in TLS 1.3 we're adding some synthetic values that have no equivalent values in the TLS 1.2 Б as defined in the IANA <уhttps://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-2Д TLS ClientCertificateType Identifiers> registry. These values are inferred from the TLS 1.3 signature_algorithmsЛ extension, and will allow clients to present Ed25519 and Ed448 certificates when these become supported.є tls>Set to Just-value when a TLS13 certificate request is received╔ tls8Set to Just-value when a certificate request is receivedі tlsйIn TLS 1.3, these are separate from the certificate issuer signature algorithm hints in the callback data. In TLS 1.2 the same list is overloaded for both purposes. Not present in TLS 1.1 and earlierї tls4Set to true when a client certificate chain was sent╗ tlsЭSet to true when a certificate request was sent. This applies only to requests sent during handshake (not post-handshake).╘ tlsеCompress the whole transcript with the specified function. Function fО takes the handshake digest as input and returns an encoded handshake message to replace the transcript with.╙ tls6Generate the master secret from the pre master secret.╚ tls─Set master secret and as a side effect generate the key block with all the right parameters, and setup the pending tx/rx state.╙ tlschosen transmission versiontls2the role (Client or Server) of the generating sidetlsthe pre master secret╛ tlschosen versionъґ ў ╞ ╟ ╠ СЖТУВ╡ ё Ё Є ╣ І Ї ╦ ╧ ╨ ╩ ╪ Ґ Ў © є ╔ і ї ╗ ю а б ц д е ф г х и й к л м н о п я р с т у ж в ь ы з ш э щ ч ъ Ю А Б Ц Д Е Ф Г Х И Й К Л М Н О П Я Р С Т У Ж В Ь Ы З Ш ╘ Э ╙ ╚ ╛ % BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"`pЬtlsHKDF-Extractз function. Returns the pseudorandom key (PRK) from salt and input keying material (IKM).ЫtlsHKDF-Expand-LabelЫ function. Returns output keying material of the specified length from the PRK, customized for a TLS label and context.ЬЩ Ы& BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredcОЧ tlsExtended Master SecretЪ tls-Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN)─tlsSecure Renegotiation│tls?Max fragment extension with length from 512 bytes to 4096 bytesаRFC 6066 defines: If a server receives a maximum fragment length negotiation request for a value other than the allowed values, it MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert.хSo, if a server receives MaxFragmentLengthOther, it must send the alert.┌tls²Server Name extension including the name type and the associated name. the associated name decoding is dependant of its name type. name type = 0 : hostname┐tlsкExtension class to transform bytes to and from a high level Extension type.└tls.all supported extensions by the implementationО/0123456789┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠╡ЁЄЧ ╣Ъ І─ЇЗШЭЩЧ│╦╧╨╩╪┌Ґ┐Ў©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьыЪзш└' BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferredдеявэe7г┌эщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТУЖВЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║( BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredfО─tls3Certificate Usage callback possible returns values.│tlsusage of certificate accepted┌tlsusage of certificate rejected┐tls&Certificate and Chain rejection reason!╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠╡#-Ё─│┌┐└┘├┤┬Є╣ІЇ) BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferredi┴tlsA collection of hooks actions.▀tls)called at each handshake message received▄tls5called at each handshake message received for TLS 1.3█tls1called at each certificate chain message received▌tls/hooks on IO and packets, receiving and sending.▐tlsHooks for logging8This is called when sending and receiving packets and IO ┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■╦* BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferredm"≤tls▒try to create a new credential object from a public certificate and the associated private key that are stored on the filesystem in PEM format.≥tlssimilar to ≤ж but take the certificate and private key from memory instead of from the filesystem. tlssimilar to ≤/ but also allow specifying chain certificates.⌡tlssimilar to ≥/ but also allow specifying chain certificates.╧tls Checks whether certificate signatures in the chain comply with a list of hash/signature algorithm pairs. Currently the verification applies only to the signature of the leaf certificate, and when not self-signed. This may be extended to additional chain elements in the future.≤tls!public certificate (X.509 format)tlsprivate key associated tls!public certificate (X.509 format)tls!chain certificates (X.509 format)tlsprivate key associated∙√≈≤≥ ⌡╨╩╪Ґ╧+ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred╙Iа°tlsяA set of callbacks run by the server for various corners of the TLS establishment·tls÷This action is called when a client certificate chain is received from the client. When it returns a CertificateUsageReject value, the handshake is aborted.▐The function is not expected to verify the key-usage extension of the certificate. This verification is performed by the library internally. Default: returns the followings:рCertificateUsageReject (CertificateRejectOther "no client certificates expected") ÷tlsнThis action is called when the client certificate cannot be verified. Return Ў' to accept the certificate anyway, or © to fail verification.Default: returns ©═tlsИAllow the server to choose the cipher relative to the the client version and the client list of ciphers.ЬThis could be useful with old clients and as a workaround to the BEAST (where RC4 is sometimes prefered with TLS < 1.1)'The client cipher list cannot be empty.$Default: taking the head of ciphers.║tlsТAllow the server to indicate additional credentials to be used depending on the host name indicated by the client.√This is most useful for transparent proxies where credentials must be generated on the fly according to the host the client is trying to connect to.ЫReturned credentials may be ignored if a client does not support the signature algorithms used in the certificate chain.Default: returns ю╒tlsяAt each new handshake, we call this hook to see if we allow handshake to happens.Default: returns ЎёtlsМAllow the server to choose an application layer protocol suggested from the client through the ALPN (Application Layer Protocol Negotiation) extensions. If the server supports no protocols that the client advertises an empty К should be returned. Default: ЮєtlsйAllow to modify extensions to be sent in EncryptedExtensions of TLS 1.3.Default: 'return . id'╔tlsнA set of callbacks run by the clients for various corners of TLS establishmentїtlsєThis action is called when the a certificate request is received from the server. The callback argument is the information from the request. The server, at its discretion, may be willing to continue the handshake without a client certificate. Therefore, the callback is free to return Ю▒ to indicate that no client certificate should be sent, despite the server's request. In some cases it may be appropriate to get user consent before sending the certificate; the content of the user's certificate may be sensitive and intended only for specific servers.║The action should select a certificate chain of one of the given certificate types and one of the certificates in the chain should (if possible) be signed by one of the given distinguished names. Some servers, that don't have a narrow set of preferred issuer CAs, will send an empty В╧ list, rather than send all the names from their trusted CA bundle. If the client does not have a certificate chaining to a matching CA, it may choose a default certificate instead.вEach certificate except the last should be signed by the following one. The returned private key must be for the first certificates in the chain. This key will be used to signing the certificate verify message.ЭThe public key in the first certificate, and the matching returned private key must be compatible with one of the list of иЭ value when provided. TLS 1.3 changes the meaning of the list elements, adding explicit code points for each supported pair of hash and signature (public key) algorithms, rather than combining separate codes for the hash and key. For details see 1https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#section-4.2.3RFC 8446м section 4.2.3. When no compatible certificate chain is available, return Ю└ if it is OK to continue without a client certificate. Returning a non-matching certificate should result in a handshake failure.кWhile the TLS version is not provided to the callback, the content of the signature_algorithmsМ list provides a strong hint, since TLS 1.3 servers will generally list RSA pairs with a hash component of Intrinsic (0x08).ыNote that is is the responsibility of this action to select a certificate matching one of the requested certificate types (public key algorithms). Returning a non-matching one will lead to handshake failure later.Default: returns Ю anyway.╗tlsзUsed by the client to validate the server certificate. The default implementation calls ╠х which validates according to the default hooks and checks provided by Data.X509.Validationт. This can be replaced with a custom validation function using different settings.ВThe function is not expected to verify the key-usage extension of the end-entity certificate, as this depends on the dynamically-selected cipher and this part should not be cached. Key-usage verification is performed by the library internally. Default: ╠╘tlsЯThis action is called when the client sends ClientHello to determine ALPN values such as '["h2", "http/1.1"]'.Default: returns Ю╙tls═This action is called to validate DHE parameters when the server selected a finite-field group not part of the "Supported Groups Registry" or not part of и list.░With TLS 1.3 custom groups have been removed from the protocol, so this callback is only used when the version negotiated is 1.2 or below.цThe default behavior with (dh_p, dh_g, dh_size) and pub as follows: rejecting if dh_p is even,rejecting unless 1 < dh_g && dh_g < dh_p - 1+rejecting unless 1 < dh_p && pub < dh_p - 16rejecting if dh_size < 1024 (to prevent Logjam attack)-See RFC 7919 section 3.1 for recommandations.╚tls Type for ╗4. This type synonym is to make document readable.╛tls Type for ї4. This type synonym is to make document readable.ґtls,Group usage callback possible return values.ўtlsusage of group accepted╞tls-usage of group provides insufficient security╟tls>usage of group rejected for other reason (specified as string)╠tls+usage of group with an invalid public value╡tls2Parameters that are common to clients and servers.ЄtlsУThe list of certificates and private keys that a server will use as part of authentication to clients. Actual credentials that are used are selected dynamically from this list based on client capabilities. Additional credentials returned by ║ are also considered.ьWhen credential list is left empty (the default value), no key exchange can take place. Default: ю╣tls├Callbacks used by clients and servers in order to resume TLS sessions. The default implementation never resumes sessions. Package 7https://hackage.haskell.org/package/tls-session-managertls-session-manager' provides an in-memory implementation. Default: vІtls░A collection of trust anchors to be used by a client as part of validation of server certificates. This is set as first argument to function ╗. Package /https://hackage.haskell.org/package/x509-systemx509-systemх gives access to a default certificate store configured in the system. Default: юЇtlsдCallbacks that may be used by a client to cache certificate validation results (positive or negative) and avoid expensive signature check. The default implementation does not have any caching.See the default value of -.╦tls;Additional extensions to be sent during the Hello sequence.ёFor a client this is always included in message ClientHello. For a server, this is sent in messages ServerHello or EncryptedExtensions based on the TLS version. Default: []╧tls8Client or server policy regarding Extended Master Secret╨tls"Extended Master Secret is not used╩tls!Extended Master Secret is allowed╪tls"Extended Master Secret is requiredҐtlsдList all the supported algorithms, versions, ciphers, etc supported.©tlsЮSupported versions by this context. On the client side, the highest version will be used to establish the connection. On the server side, the highest version that is less or equal than the client version will be chosen.кVersions should be listed in preference order, i.e. higher versions first. Default: [TLS13,TLS12,TLS11,TLS10]юtlsсSupported cipher methods. The default is empty, specify a suitable cipher list. , is often a good choice. Default: []аtlsУSupported compressions methods. By default only the "null" compression is supported, which means no compression will be performed. Allowing other compression method is not advised as it causes a connection failure when TLS 1.3 is negotiated. Default: [nullCompression]бtls⌠All supported hash/signature algorithms pair for client certificate verification and server signature in (EC)DHE, ordered by decreasing priority.бThis list is sent to the peer as part of the "signature_algorithms" extension. It is used to restrict accepted signatures received from the peer at TLS level (not in X.509 certificates), but only when the TLS version is 1.2 or above. In order to disable SHA-1 one must then also disable earlier protocol versions in ©.вThe list also impacts the selection of possible algorithms when generating signatures.≈Note: with TLS 1.3 some algorithms have been deprecated and will not be used even when listed in the parameter: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, RSA PKCS#1, DSS.Default:╔ [ (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd448) , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureEd25519) , (Struct.HashSHA256, SignatureECDSA) , (Struct.HashSHA384, SignatureECDSA) , (Struct.HashSHA512, SignatureECDSA) , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA512) , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA384) , (HashIntrinsic, SignatureRSApssRSAeSHA256) , (Struct.HashSHA512, SignatureRSA) , (Struct.HashSHA384, SignatureRSA) , (Struct.HashSHA256, SignatureRSA) , (Struct.HashSHA1, SignatureRSA) , (Struct.HashSHA1, SignatureDSS) ] цtls/Secure renegotiation defined in RFC5746. If Ў7, clients send the renegotiation_info extension. If ЎГ, servers handle the extension or the renegotiation SCSV then send the renegotiation_info extension. Default: ЎдtlsIf Ўщ, renegotiation is allowed from the client side. This is vulnerable to DOS attacks. If ©и, renegotiation is allowed only from the server side via HelloRequest. Default: ©еtlsоThe mode regarding extended master secret. Enabling this extension provides better security for TLS versions 1.0 to 1.2. TLS 1.3 provides the security properties natively and does not need the extension.йBy default the extension is enabled but not required. If mode is set to ╪▓, the handshake will fail when the peer does not support the extension. It is also advised to disable SSLv3 which does not have this mechanism. Default: ╩фtlsSet if we support session. Default: Ўгtls4Support for fallback SCSV defined in RFC7507. If ЎБ, servers reject handshakes which suggest a lower protocol than the highest protocol supported. Default: ЎхtlsДIn ver <= TLS1.0, block ciphers using CBC are using CBC residue as IV, which can be guessed by an attacker. Hence, an empty packet is normally sent before a normal data packet, to prevent guessability. Some Microsoft TLS-based protocol implementations, however, consider these empty packets as a protocol violation and disconnect. If this parameter is ©ы, empty packets will never be added, which is less secure, but might help in rare cases. Default: ЎиtlsжA list of supported elliptic curves and finite-field groups in the preferred order.≥The list is sent to the server as part of the "supported_groups" extension. It is used in both clients and servers to restrict accepted groups in DH key exchange. Up until TLS v1.2, it is also used by a client to restrict accepted elliptic curves in ECDSA signatures.тThe default value includes all groups with security strength of 128 bits or more. Default: д[X25519,X448,P256,FFDHE3072,FFDHE4096,P384,FFDHE6144,FFDHE8192,P521]лtls"Request a certificate from client. Default: ©мtls▒This is a list of certificates from which the disinguished names are sent in certificate request messages. For TLS1.0, it should not be empty. Default: '[]'нtls⌠Server Optional Diffie Hellman parameters. Setting parameters is necessary for FFDHE key exchange when clients are not compatible with RFC 7919.9Value can be one of the standardized groups from module Network.TLS.Extra.FFDHE& or custom parameters generated with -.. Default: ЮоtlsSee the default value of °.пtlsSee the default value of ╡.яtlsSee the default value of Ґ.рtlsSee the default value of Ю.сtlsРServer accepts this size of early data in TLS 1.3. 0 (or lower) means that the server does not accept early data. Default: 0тtls╒Lifetime in seconds for session tickets generated by the server. Acceptable value range is 0 to 604800 (7 days). The default lifetime is 86400 seconds (1 day).Default: 86400 (one day)вtls Default: Юьtls└Define the name of the server, along with an extra service identification blob. this is important that the hostname part is properly filled for security reason, as it allow to properly associate the remote side with the given certificate during a handshake.ЎThe extra blob is useful to differentiate services running on the same host, but that might have different certificates given. It's only used as part of the X509 validation infrastructure.This value is typically set by Ф.ыtlsщAllow the use of the Server Name Indication TLS extension during handshake, which allow the client to specify which host name, it's trying to access. This is useful to distinguish CNAME aliasing (e.g. web virtual host). Default: Ўзtls1try to establish a connection using this session. Default: ЮшtlsSee the default value of ╡.эtlsSee the default value of ╔.щtlsиIn this element, you'll need to override the default empty value of of ю with a suitable cipherlist.See the default value of Ґ.чtlsSee the default value of Ю.ъtls▐Client tries to send this early data in TLS 1.3 if possible. If not accepted by the server, it is application's responsibility to re-sent it. Default: ЮЮtls-All settings should not be used in productionБtlsЄDisable the true randomness in favor of deterministic seed that will produce a deterministic random from. This is useful for tests and debugging purpose. Do not use in production Default: ЮЦtlsЫAdd a way to print the seed that was randomly generated. re-using the same seed will reproduce the same randomness with БDefault: no printingДtls0Force to choose this version in the server side. Default: ЮЕtlsPrinting master keys.Default: no printingзЗШЭЩЧ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕаФ/ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"%&иэ╟dбtlssimple pending actionцtls=pending action taking transcript hash up to preceding messageГtlsйA TLS Context keep tls specific state, parameters and backend information.Хtls6return the backend object associated with this contextдtlshas the handle EOFed or not.еtls0has the handshake been done and been successful.фtls-empty packet workaround for CBC guessability.гtls enable the reception of compatibility SSLv2 client hello. the flag will be set to false regardless of its initial value after the first packet received.хtls#maximum size of plaintext fragmentsиtlscurrent tx stateйtlscurrent rx stateкtlsoptional handshake stateлtlshooks for this contextмtls;lock to use for writing data (including updating the state)нtls;lock to use for reading data (including updating the state)оtlsМlock used during read/write when receiving and sending packet. it is usually nested in a write or read lock.пtlspending PHA requestsИtls=Information related to a running context, e.g. current cipherУtls.A shortcut for 'backendFlush . ctxConnection'.Жtls.A shortcut for 'backendClose . ctxConnection'.Вtls%Information about the current context█CDEFG\]^_`abcdefghЗШЭЩЧ┴┼▀▄█▌йклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъФябцрстужвьГыХзшэщдефгхийкчъЮАлмноБпЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТИЙКУЖВЛМНОПЯРСЬТУЖВЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─ │ ┌ ┐ └ ┘ ├ ┤ ┬ 0 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred╠в┴ ┼ ▀ 1 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredЁh▄ tlsйrecvRecord receive a full TLS record (header + data), from the other side..The record is disengaged from the record layer▄ tlsTLS contexttls1flag to enable SSLv2 compat ClientHello receptiontls;number of AppData bytes to accept above normal maximum size▄ █ 2 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredбЁь▌ ▐ 3 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"ЄGМПЯРябц░ ▒ ▓ ⌠ ■ ∙ √ ≈ ≤ ≥ ⌡ 4 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredЇў° tls█Generate a server random suitable for the version selected by the server and its supported versions. We use an 8-byte downgrade suffix when the selected version is lowered because of incomplete client support, but also when a version downgrade has been forced with debugVersionForced√. This second part allows to test that the client implementation correctly detects downgrades. The suffix is not used when forcing TLS13 to a server not officially supporting TLS13 (this is not a downgrade scenario but only the consequence of our debug API allowing this).² tls┌Test if the negotiated version was artificially downgraded (that is, for other reason than the versions supported by the client).° ² · ÷ ═ 5 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred╦≥║ tlsКencodePacket transform a packet into marshalled data related to current state and updating state on the go║ ╒ ё є 6 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferredявэ╩h╔ tlsЙState monad used to group several packets together and send them on wire as single flight. When packets are loaded in the monad, they are logged immediately, update the context digest and transcript, but actual sending is deferred. Packets are sent all at once when the monadic computation ends (normal termination but also if interrupted by an exception).і tlsSend one packet to the contextї tls╛receive one packet from the context that contains 1 or many messages (many only in case of handshake). if will returns a TLSError if the packet is unexpected or malformed ╔ і ╗ ї ╘ ╙ ╚ ╛ ґ 7 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredацЎ·ў tlsКTest whether the argument is a public key supported for signature at the specified TLS version. This also accepts a key for RSA encryption. This test is performed by clients or servers before verifying a remote Certificate Verify.╞ tlsчTest whether the argument is matching key pair supported for signature. This also accepts material for RSA encryption. This test is performed by servers or clients before using a credential from the local configuration.╟ tlsюTest whether the public key satisfies a predicate about the elliptic curve. When the public key is not suitable for ECDSA, like RSA for instance, the predicate is not used and the result is Ў.╠ ╡ Ё Є ╣ І Ї ╦ ╧ ╨ ў ╞ ╩ ╟ ╪ 8 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"цXҐ tls0Check that the key is compatible with a list of БТ values. Ed25519 and Ed448 have no assigned code point and are checked with extension "signature_algorithms" only.Ў tlsTranslate a и to an acceptable Б°. Perhaps this needs to take supported groups into account, so that, for example, if we don't support any shared ECDSA groups with the server, we return Ю rather than Е.╧Therefore, this interface is preliminary. It gets us moving in the right direction. The interplay between all the various TLS extensions and certificate selection is rather complex.нThe goal is to ensure that the client certificate request callback only sees БН values that are supported by the library and also compatible with the server signature algorithms extension.дSince we don't yet support ECDSA private keys, the caller will use Ж, to filter those out for now, leaving just RSAю as the only supported client certificate algorithm for TLS 1.3.1FIXME: Add RSA_PSS_PSS signatures when supported. © Ґ ю а Ў б ц д е ф г х и 9 BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferredцэй к л : Safe-Inferred"ф5ЫtlsАReturn the message that a TLS endpoint can add to its local log for the specified library error.м tls1when a new handshake is done, wrap up & clean up.н tls?process a list of handshakes message in the recv state machine.о tls╚Store the specified keypair. Whether the public key and private key actually match is left for the peer to discover. We're not presently burning CPU to detect that misconfiguration. We verify only that the types of keys match and that it does not include an algorithm that would not be safe.п я р с т у ж Ыв ь м ы з ш н э щ ч ъ Ю о А Б ; BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredфмЦ Д Е Ф Г < BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"ях╦Х tls1TLS13 handshake wrap up & clean up. Contrary to handshakeTerminate², this does not handle session, which is managed separately for TLS 1.3. This does not reset byte counters because renegotiation is not allowed. And a few more state attributes are preserved, necessary for TLS13 handshake modes, session tickets and post-handshake authentication.(И Й К Л М Н О П Я Р С Т У Ж В Ь Ы Х З Ш Э Щ Ч Ъ ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐= BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"м═░tls)Put the server context in handshake mode.⌠Expect a client hello message as parameter. This is useful when the client hello has been already poped from the recv layer to inspect the packet.│When the function returns, a new handshake has been succesfully negociated. On any error, a HandshakeFailed exception is raised.handshake protocol (-receiving, -к sending, [] optional): (no session) (session resumption) <- client hello <- client hello -> server hello -> server hello -> [certificate] -> [server key xchg] -> [cert request] -> hello done <- [certificate] <- client key xchg <- [cert verify] -change cipher - change cipher -finish -з finish -> change cipher <- change cipher -> finish <- finish▒tls>receive Client data in handshake until the Finished handshake.Г<- [certificate] <- client key xchg <- [cert verify] <- change cipher <- finish▓░⌠■> BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"ЦА∙tlsЦStore the keypair and check that it is compatible with the current protocol version and a list of Б values.√tls─When the server requests a client certificate, we try to obtain a suitable certificate chain and private key via the callback in the client parameters. It is OK for the callback to return an empty chain, in many cases the client certificate is optional. If the client wishes to abort the handshake for lack of a suitable certificate, it can throw an exception in the callback.The return value is Ю when no CertificateRequest was received and no Certificate? message needs to be sent. An empty chain means that an empty Certificate> message needs to be sent to the server, naturally without a CertificateVerify. A non-empty єю is the chain to send to the server along with a corresponding CertificateVerify.With TLS < 1.2 the server's CertificateRequestО does not carry a signature algorithm list. It has a list of supported public key signing algorithms in the certificate_types' field. The hash is implicit. It is ─ for DSS and ┘ for RSA.With TLS == 1.2 the server's CertificateRequest always has a supported_signature_algorithmsў list, as a fixed component of the structure. This list is (wrongly) overloaded to also limit X.509 signatures in the client's certificate chain. The BCP strategy is to find a compatible chain if possible, but else ignore the constraint, and let the server verify the chain as it sees fit. The supported_signature_algorithmsы field is only obligatory with respect to signatures on TLS messages, in this case the CertificateVerify message. The certificate_types field is still included.With TLS 1.3 the server's CertificateRequest has a mandatory signature_algorithms extension, the signature_algorithms_cert╗ extension, which is optional, carries a list of algorithms the server promises to support in verifying the certificate chain. As with TLS 1.2, the client's makes a best-effortд to deliver a compatible certificate chain where all the CA signatures are known to be supported, but it should not abort the connection just because the chain might not work out, just send the best chain you have and let the server worry about the rest. The supported public key algorithms are now inferred from the signature_algorithms extension and certificate_types is gone.(With TLS 1.3, we synthesize and store a certificate_types& field at the time that the server's CertificateRequestЬ message is received. This is then present across all the protocol versions, and can be used to determine whether a CertificateRequest was received or not.If signature_algorithms is Ю), then we're doing TLS 1.0 or 1.1. The signature_algorithms_certШ extension is optional in TLS 1.3, and so the application callback will not be able to distinguish between TLS 1.[01] and TLS 1.3 with no certificate algorithm hints, but this just simplifies the chain selection process, all CA signatures are OK.≈tlsReturn a most preferred HandAndSignatureAlgorithm╟ that is compatible with the local key and server's signature algorithms (both already saved). Must only be called for TLS versions 1.2 and up, with compatibility function ю or а based on version.The values in the server's signature_algorithmsЖ extension are in descending order of preference. However here the algorithms are selected by client preference in cHashSigs.≤tlsReturn the supported Бм values that are compatible with at least one supported signature algorithm.≥tlsхTLS 1.2 and below. Send the client handshake messages that follow the ServerHello, etc. except for CCS and Finished.АXXX: Is any buffering done here to combined these messages into a single TCP packet? Otherwise we're prone to Nagle delays, or in any case needlessly generate multiple small packets, where a single larger packet will do. The TLS 1.3 code path seems to separating record generation and transmission and sending multiple records in a single packet.> [certificate]> client key exchange> [cert verify] tlsexperimentalunknown Safe-InferredБ?Зtls:Post-handshake certificate request with TLS 1.3. Returns ЎУ if the request was possible, i.e. if TLS 1.3 is used and the remote client supports post-handshake authentication.⌠■²З·@ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredЦ2ШtlsСHandshake for a new TLS connection This is to be called at the beginning of a connection, and during renegotiation▓░⌡°Ш÷A BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredЕ╦Щtlsюcreate a new context using the backend and parameters specified.Чtls"create a new context on an handle.Ъtls!create a new context on a socket.└tlsGet TLS Finished sent to peer┘tls#Get TLS Finished received from peerЩtlsнBackend abstraction with specific method to interact with the connection type.tlsParameters of the context.ЧtlsHandle of the connection.tlsParameters of the context.ЪtlsSocket of the connection.tlsParameters of the context.щ┴┼▀▄█▌рстужГыХзшэщдефгхийкчъЮАлмноБпЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТЙКУЖВЛМНОПЯРСЬТУЖЬЫЗШЪ─ │ ┌ ┐ └ ┘ ├ ЭЩЧЪ─│┌┐└┘B BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"эЙЯ ├tlsHow to update keys in TLS 1.3┤tlsUnidirectional key update┬tls&Bidirectional key update (normal case)┴tlsбnotify the context that this side wants to close connection. this is important that it is called before closing the handle, otherwise the session might not be resumable (for version < TLS1.2).&this doesn't actually close the handle┼tlsжIf the ALPN extensions have been used, this will return get the protocol agreed upon.▀tlsДIf the Server Name Indication extension has been used, return the hostname specified by the client.▄tlsшsendData sends a bunch of data. It will automatically chunk data to acceptable packet size█tlsЪGet data out of Data packet, and automatically renegotiate if a Handshake ClientHello is received. An empty result means EOF.▌tls/same as recvData but returns a lazy bytestring.▐tlsвUpdating appication traffic secrets for TLS 1.3. If this API is called for TLS 1.3, Ў is returned. Otherwise, © is returned.і ї ЗШ├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐ BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-Inferred"ВЫ░tlsОCallbacks implemented by QUIC and to be called by TLS at specific points during the handshake. TLS may invoke them from external threads but calls are not concurrent. Only a single callback function is called at a given point in time.▓tls√Called by TLS so that QUIC sends one or more handshake fragments. The content transiting on this API is the plaintext of the fragments and QUIC responsability is to encrypt this payload with the key material given for the specified level and an appropriate encryption scheme.ИThe size of the fragments may exceed QUIC datagram limits so QUIC may break them into smaller fragments.▒The handshake protocol sometimes combines content at two levels in a single flight. The TLS library does its best to provide this in the same quicSendч call and with a multi-valued argument. QUIC can then decide how to transmit this optimally.⌠tls║Called by TLS to receive from QUIC the next plaintext handshake fragment. The argument specifies with which encryption level the fragment should be decrypted.?QUIC may return partial fragments to TLS. TLS will then call quicRecv▐ again as long as necessary. Note however that fragments must be returned in the correct sequence, i.e. the order the TLS peer emitted them.ІThe function may return an error to TLS if end of stream is reached or if a protocol error has been received, believing the handshake cannot proceed any longer. If the TLS handshake protocol cannot recover from this error, the failure condition will be reported back to QUIC through the control interface.■tlsэCalled by TLS when new encryption material is ready to be used in the handshake. The next ▓ or ⌠⌠ may now use the associated encryption level (although the previous level is also possible: directions Send/Recv do not change at the same time).∙tlsнCalled by TLS when QUIC-specific extensions have been received from the peer.√tlsCalled when Ш is done. °' is finished after calling this hook. ⌡ calls █: after calling this hook to wait for new session tickets.≈tlsArgument given to ■' when encryption material is available.≤tls6Key material and parameters for traffic at 0-RTT level≥tls:Key material and parameters for traffic at handshake level tlsexperimentalunknown Safe-InferredЫ&Д└ ┘ ├ ┤ ┬ ┴ ┼ ▀ В\gfedcba`_]^hionmljkЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─┼┼┴┬┤├┘└┐│┌▀▌▄█▐≥≤≈√∙■⌠▓░▒ ²⌡°·÷═єё║╒╔ії╠╟╞ўґ╛╚╙╗╘▀╛╚╙╘╗їі╔єё╒║═÷·²° ≥≤≈√∙■⌠▓▒░▐▌█⌡▄╡ЁЄґў╞╣ІЇ╟╦╠╡╧ЁЄ╣╨ЎҐ╩╪І╧Ї╦╨баю©ЎҐ╩╪цхгфде©юаийвжутсряпонмкльАЮыъчщэзшБОНМЛКЙИХГФЕЦДбфецдгйхиклмЖнопярстужвАЮъчщэшзьыПКЙИХГФЕДБЦЛМНОСРПЯТУ▄ ░ ▐ █ ▌ ▒ ▓ ⌠ ■ ∙ √ ≈ ≤ ≥ ⌡ ° ² · ÷ ═ ║ ╒ ё є ╔ і ї ╗ ╘ ╙ ╚ ╛ ґ ў ╞ ╟ ╠ ╦ Ё ╧ ╡ ╨ ╩ ╪ Ґ Ў © ю а б ц д е ф Є г х и ╣ й к л м н о п я р с т у ж в І ь ы з ш э щ ч ъ Ю · ÷ ═ ║ ╒ ▌ ▐ ║ ╒ ё є і ї BSD-style#Vincent Hanquez experimentalunknown Safe-InferredЩ_єtls█Getting certificates from a client, if any. Note that the certificates are not sent by a client on resumption even if client authentication is required. So, this API would be replaced by the one which can treat both cases of full-negotiation and resumption.╡ "! #'&%$()-,+*./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIWXYZ[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}~┘─│┌└┐├┤┬┼▀⌡▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ °²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьзшэщчъыЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯЫЬВЖУСРТЗ│─ЪЧЩЭШ┌┐▌█▄▀┼┴┬┤├└┘▐▓░▒⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ·²⌡°÷═║╒ёє╔іїСЖТУВЗШЭЩЧ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТУЖВЬЗШЭЩЧЪ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐ёє╡ГЩШ▄█┴:;<=>?@ABЭужвьызшэщчъФйклмнопярст╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╔ії╗╘╙╛╚°²·÷═║╒ёєCDEFGҐЎ©юабцдефгхиЮАБЦДЕ∙√≈≤≥ ⌡pqrstuvh\]^_`abcdefgZ[Y-,+*()'&%$#ijklmnowx}иьзшэщчъыЮАйклмнопярстужв/0123456789╧╨╩╪HIґў╞╟╠─│┌┐└┘├┤┬БЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНО.ЗШЭЩЧХУЖИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТВ╟╡╠ЁСЖТУВє┼▀▐├┤┬З└┘┴┼▀▄█▌Ь┼─П│┌▐░▒▓⌠■Є╣цдефгх┐╨╩╪ҐЎ©юаб├┤┬▀⌡▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ °²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ІЇ╦╧yz{|W ┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌ЗШ┌ЭЩЧЪ─│▐░▒▓⌠■∙ ⌡°²·≤≥≈√ё~└┐┌│─┘ЯРТСУЖВЬЫXі╒║═÷їє╔▌ЧЪё"! ═DEFDEGDEHDEIDEJDEKDELDEMDNODNPDNQDNRDNSDNTDNUDNVDNWDNXYZ[YZ\YZ]YZ^YZ_YZ`YZaYZbYZcYZdYZdYZeYZfYZgYZhYZiYZiYjkYjlYjmYjnYjoYjpYjqYjrYjsYjtYjtuvwxyz{|}~─│┌┐└┘├├┤┬┴┼ ▀ ▀ ▄ █ ▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≈≤≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠╡Ё Є Є ╣ І Ї ╦ ╧╨╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛМНООПЯРСТУУЖВЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚╛ґў╞╟╠╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужжвьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕЕФФГГХ,ИЙКЛМНОПЯРСТУЖВЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙╚$╛$ґ$ў$╞$╟%╠%╡&Ё&Є&╣&І&Ї&╦(╧(╨(╩(╪(Ґ(Ў(©(ю(а)б)б)ц)д)е)ф)г)г)х)и)й)к*л*л*м*н*о*п*я+р+р+с+т+у+ж+в+ь+ы+з+з+ш+э+щ+ч+ъ+Ю+А+Б+Ц+Д+Е+Ф+Ф+Г+Х+И+Й+К+Л+М+Н+О+П+П+Я+Р+С+Т+У+Ж+В+Ь+Ы+З+Ш+Э+Э+Щ+Ч+Ъ+─+│+┌+┐+└+┘+├+├+┤+┬+┴+┼+▀+▄+█+▌+▐+░+░+▒+▓+⌠+■+∙/√/≈/≤/≤/≥/ /⌡/°/²/·/÷/═/║/╒/ё/є/╔/і:ї?╗@╘A╙A╚A╛AґAўA╞A╟A╠A╡AЁBЄB╣BІBЇB╦B╧B╨B╩B╪BҐЎЎ©юабцдефгхийклмнопярстужвьызьышьыэщчъЮАъБЦъБДъЮЕъФГъЮХъЮИъЮЙъЮКъЮЛъЮМъЮНъЮОПЯРПЯСПЯТПЯУПЯЖПЯВПЯЬПЯЫъЗШъЗЭъЮЩъЮЧъЮЪъЮ─ъЮ│ъЮ┌ъ┐└ъ┐┘ъ┐├ъ┐┤ъ┐┬ъ┐┴ъ┐┼ъ┐▀ъ┐▄ъ┐█ъ┐▌ъ┐▐ъ░▒ъ░▓ъЮ⌠ъЮ■ъЮ∙ъЮ√ъ≈≤ъ≈≥ъ≈ П⌡°П⌡²П⌡·П⌡÷П⌡═ъ║╒ъ║ёъ║єъ║╔ії╗ъ┐╘ъ┐╙ъ╚╛ъ╚ґъ╚ўъ╚╞ъ╚╞ъ╚╟ъ╚╠ъ╚╠ъ╚╡ъ╚Ёъ╚Ёъ╚Єъ╚╣ъ╚╣ъ╚Іъ╚Їъ╚╦ъ╚╧ъ╚╧ъ╚╨ъ╚╩ъ╚╪ъФҐъФЎъФ©ъФюъФаъФбъФцъФдъФеъФфъФгъФхъФиъФйъклъ░мъ░нъ░оъпяъпяъпръпсъптъпуъпжъпвъпьъпыъзшъзшъзэъ┐щъ┐чъ┐ъъ┐Юъ┐Аъ┐Бъ┐Цъ┐Дъ┐Еъ┐Фъ┐Гъ┐Хъ┐ИъЙКъЙЛъЙМъЙНъЙОъЙПъЙЯъЙРъЙСъЙТъЙУъЙЖъЙВъЙЬъЙЫъЙЗъЙШъЙЭъЙЩъЙЧъЙЪъЙ─ъЙ│ъЙ┌ъЙ┐ъЙ└ъЙ┘ъЙ├ъЙ┤ъЙ┬ъЙ┴ъЙ┼ъЙ▀ъЙ▄ъЙ█ъЙ▌ъЙ▐ъЙ░ъЙ▒ъЙ▓ъЙ⌠ъЙ■ъЙ∙ъЙ√ъЙ≈ъЙ≤ъЙ≥ъЙ ъЙ⌡ъЙ°ъЙ²ъЙ·ъЙ÷ъЙ═ъЙ║ъЙ╒ъЙёъЙєъ╔іъ╔іъ╔їъ╔╗ъ╔╗ъ╔╘ъ╔╙ъ╔╙ъ╔╚ъ╔╛ъ╔╛ъ╔ґъ╔ўъ╔ўъ╔╞ъ╔╟ъ╔╟ъ╔╠ъ╔╡ъ╔ЁъЄ╣ъЄ╣ъЄІъЄЇъЄ╦ъ╧╨ъ╧╨ъ╧╩ъ╧╪ъ╧╪ъ╧Ґъ╧Ўъ╧Ўъ╧©ъ╧юъ╧юъ╧аъ╧бъ║цъ║дъ║еъ║фъ║гъ║хъ║иъйкъйлъймъйнъйоъйпъйяъйръйсъйтъйуъйжъйвъйьъйыъйзъйшъйэъйщъйчъйъъйЮъйАъйБъйЦъйДъйЕъйФъйГъйХъйИъБЙъБКъБЛъБМъБНъБОъБПъБЯъБРъБСъБТъБУъБЖъБВъБЬъБЫъБЗъБШъБЭъБЩъБЧъБЪъБ─ъБ│ъБ┌ъБ┐ъБ└ъБ┘ъБ├ъБ┤ъБ┬ъ┴┼ъ┴▀ъ┴▄ъ┴█ъ┴▌ъ┴▐ъ┴░ъ┴▒ъ▓⌠ъ▓■ъ▓∙ъЮ√ъЮ≈ъЮ≤ъЮ≥ъЮ ъЮ⌡ъЮ°ъЮ²ъЮ·ъЮ÷ъЮ═ъЮ║ъЮ╒ъЮёъЮєъЮ╔ъЮіъЮїъЮ╗ъ╔╘╙ ╚ ╛ ґ ў ╞╟╠╡╟╠Ё╟╠Є╟╠╣╟ІЇ╟І╦ ╧ ╧ ╨ ╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийкллммноппярсттуужвьыз·шэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГХИЙКЛъМНОПЯРСТУЖВЬЫЗШ╟ЭЩ╟ЭЧ╟ЭЪ─│┌┐└┘├┤┬┴┼▀▄█▌▐░▒▓⌠■∙√≈≤≥ ⌡°²·÷═║╒ёє╔ії╗╘╙D╚╛ґў╞╟╠╡ЁЄ╣ІЇ╦╧╨╩╪ҐЎ©юабцдефгхийклмноопяррсстужввьызшэщчъЮАБЦДЕФГГЯСХлИЙКЛЛМННОПЯРСТУЖВЬЫЗШЭЩЧЪ─ │ ┌ ┐ └ ┘ ├ ┤ ┬ ┴ ┼ ▀ ▄ █ ▌ ▐ ░ ▒ ▓ ⌠ ■ ∙ √ ≈ ≤ ≥ ╟⌡ ° ² · ÷ ═ ║ ╒ ё є ╔ і ї ╗ ╘ ╙ ╚ ╛ ґ ў ╞ ╟ ў ╞ ╠ ў ╞ ╡ ў Ё Є ў Ё ╣ ў Ё І ў Ё Ї ў Ё ╦ ╧ ╨ ╩ ╪ Ґ Ў © ю а б ц д е ф г х и й к л м н о п я р с т у ж в ь ы з ш э щ ч ъ Ю А Б Ц Д Е Е Ф Г Х И Й К Л М Н О П Я Р С Т У Ж В Ь Ы З Ш Э Щ Ч Ъ ─ │ ┌ ┐ └ ┘ ├ ┤ ┬ ┴ ┼ ▀ ▄ █ ▌ ▐ ▐ ░ ▒ ▓ ⌠ ■ ∙ √ ≈ ≈ ≤ ≥ ⌡ ° ° ² · ÷ ═ ║ ╒ ё є ╔ і ї ╗ ╘ ╙ ╚ ╛ ґ ў ╞ ╟ ╠ ╡ Ё Є ╣ І ╙ Ї ╦ ╧ ╨ ╩ ╪ "Ґ "Ґ "Ў "© "ю "а "б "ц #д #е #ф #г #х $и $й $к $л $м $н $о $п $я $р $с $т $у $ж $в $ь $ы $ы $з $ш $э $щ $ч $ъ $Ю $А $Б $Ц $Д $Е $Ф $Г $Х $И $Й $К $Л $М $Н $О $П $Я $Р $С $Т $У $Ж $В $Ь $Ы $З $Ш $Э $Щ $Ч $Ъ $─$│$┌$┐$└$┘$├$┤$┬$┴$┼$▀$▄$█$▌$▐$░$▒$▓$⌠$■$∙$√$≈$≤$≥$ 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tls-1.7.0-8OGZhQ4pTOBLPiUWWYkEaNNetwork.TLSNetwork.TLS.Extra.FFDHENetwork.TLS.QUICNetwork.TLS.Extra.CipherNetwork.TLS.Crypto.TypesNetwork.TLS.ErrTNetwork.TLS.ImportsNetwork.TLS.BackendNetwork.TLS.MeasurementNetwork.TLS.RNGNetwork.TLS.Crypto.DHNetwork.TLS.TypesNetwork.TLS.SessionNetwork.TLS.CompressionNetwork.TLS.CapNetwork.TLS.UtilNetwork.TLS.Util.ASN1Network.TLS.Util.SerializationNetwork.TLS.Crypto.IESNetwork.TLS.CryptoNetwork.TLS.StructNetwork.TLS.Struct13Network.TLS.MACNetwork.TLS.CipherNetwork.TLS.Handshake.ControlNetwork.TLS.ExtraNetwork.TLS.WireNetwork.TLS.PacketNetwork.TLS.Record.StateNetwork.TLS.Record.TypesNetwork.TLS.Record.EngageNetwork.TLS.Record.DisengageNetwork.TLS.RecordNetwork.TLS.Record.LayerNetwork.TLS.Packet13Network.TLS.Handshake.StateNetwork.TLS.KeyScheduleNetwork.TLS.ExtensionNetwork.TLS.StateNetwork.TLS.X509Network.TLS.HooksNetwork.TLS.CredentialsNetwork.TLS.Parametersciphersuite_defaultCrypto.PubKey.DHgenerateParamsNetwork.TLS.Context.InternalNetwork.TLS.Record.WritingNetwork.TLS.Record.ReadingNetwork.TLS.ReceivingNetwork.TLS.Handshake.State13Network.TLS.Handshake.RandomNetwork.TLS.SendingNetwork.TLS.IONetwork.TLS.Handshake.KeyNetwork.TLS.Handshake.SignatureNetwork.TLS.Handshake.ProcessNetwork.TLS.Handshake.Common!Network.TLS.Handshake.CertificateNetwork.TLS.Handshake.Common13Network.TLS.Handshake.ServerNetwork.TLS.Handshake.ClientNetwork.TLS.PostHandshakeNetwork.TLS.HandshakeNetwork.TLS.ContextNetwork.TLS.CoreNetwork.TLS.Internal)crypton-x509-1.7.6-IttiISMbafL289qSq38FRqData.X509.PrivateKeyPrivKeyEd448PrivKeyEd25519PrivKeyX448 PrivKeyX25519 PrivKeyEC PrivKeyDSA PrivKeyRSAPrivKeyData.X509.PublicKey PubKeyUnknownPubKeyEd448 PubKeyEd25519 PubKeyX448PubKeyX25519PubKeyECPubKeyDH PubKeyDSA PubKeyRSAPubKey5crypton-x509-validation-1.6.12-5UYJTqD8TU89pvFJxvXBrEData.X509.Validation checkFQHNcheckLeafKeyPurposecheckLeafKeyUsagecheckLeafV3checkExhaustivecheckCAConstraintscheckStrictOrderingcheckAtTimecheckTimeValidityValidationCheckshookFilterReasonhookValidateNamehookValidateTimehookMatchSubjectIssuerValidationHooksData.X509.Validation.CacheexceptionValidationCacheValidationCacheUnknownValidationCacheDeniedValidationCachePassValidationCacheResultValidationCacheQueryCallbackValidationCacheAddCallbackcacheAdd cacheQueryValidationCache%network-3.1.4.0-B2siKM4RZ608EJIWCrOTuNetwork.Socket.InfoHostNameGroupP256P384P521X25519X448 FFDHE2048 FFDHE3072 FFDHE4096 FFDHE6144 FFDHE8192 HasBackendinitializeBackend getBackendBackendbackendFlushbackendClosebackendSendbackendRecvMeasurementnbHandshakes bytesReceived 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cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256CCM8_SHA256cipher_DHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384(cipher_ECDHE_RSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256*cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256&cipher_DHE_RSA_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256cipher_TLS13_AES128GCM_SHA256cipher_TLS13_AES256GCM_SHA384$cipher_TLS13_CHACHA20POLY1305_SHA256cipher_TLS13_AES128CCM_SHA256cipher_TLS13_AES128CCM8_SHA256 cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHAcipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHAcipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA!cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128CBC_SHA256!cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256CBC_SHA384#cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CBC_SHA256#cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CBC_SHA384#cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CCM_SHA256$cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128CCM8_SHA256#cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES128GCM_SHA256#cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CCM_SHA256$cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256CCM8_SHA256#cipher_ECDHE_ECDSA_AES256GCM_SHA384!cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES128GCM_SHA256!cipher_ECDHE_RSA_AES256GCM_SHA384 CryptLevelCryptInitialCryptMasterSecretCryptEarlySecretCryptHandshakeSecretCryptApplicationSecretHandshakeMode13 FullHandshakeHelloRetryRequestPreSharedKeyRTT0hkdfExtracthkdfExpandLabelMaxFragmentEnumMaxFragment512MaxFragment1024MaxFragment2048MaxFragment4096#extensionID_QuicTransportParametersCertificateUsageCertificateUsageAcceptCertificateUsageRejectCertificateRejectReasonCertificateRejectExpiredCertificateRejectRevokedCertificateRejectUnknownCACertificateRejectAbsentCertificateRejectOtherHookshookRecvHandshakehookRecvHandshake13hookRecvCertificateshookLoggingLoggingloggingPacketSentloggingPacketRecv loggingIOSent loggingIORecvCredentials CredentialcredentialLoadX509credentialLoadX509FromMemorycredentialLoadX509Chain!credentialLoadX509ChainFromMemoryServerHooksonClientCertificateonUnverifiedClientCertonCipherChoosingonServerNameIndicationonNewHandshakeonALPNClientSuggestonEncryptedExtensionsCreatingClientHooksonCertificateRequestonServerCertificate 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