{-# LANGUAGE OverloadedStrings, CPP #-} -- | -- Module : Network.TLS.Extra.Certificate -- License : BSD-style -- Maintainer : Vincent Hanquez -- Stability : experimental -- Portability : unknown -- module Network.TLS.Extra.Certificate ( certificateVerifyChain , certificateVerifyAgainst , certificateVerifyDomain , certificateVerifyValidity , certificateFingerprint ) where import qualified Data.ByteString as B import qualified Data.ByteString.Lazy as L import Data.Certificate.X509 import System.Certificate.X509 as SysCert -- for signing/verifying certificate import qualified Crypto.Hash.SHA1 as SHA1 import qualified Crypto.Hash.MD2 as MD2 import qualified Crypto.Hash.MD5 as MD5 import qualified Crypto.Cipher.RSA as RSA import qualified Crypto.Cipher.DSA as DSA import Data.Certificate.X509Cert (oidCommonName) import Data.Time.Calendar #if defined(NOCERTVERIFY) # warning "********certificate verify chain doesn't yet work on your platform *************" # warning "********please consider contributing to the certificate to fix this issue *************" # warning "********getting trusted system certificate is platform dependant *************" {- on windows and OSX, the trusted certificates are not yet accessible, - for now, print a big fat warning (better than nothing) and returns true -} certificateVerifyChain :: [X509] -> IO Bool certificateVerifyChain _ = do putStrLn "****************** certificate verify chain doesn't yet work on your platform **********************" putStrLn "please consider contributing to the certificate package to fix this issue" return True #else -- | verify a certificates chain using the system certificates available. -- -- each certificate of the list is verified against the next certificate, until -- it can be verified against a system certificate (system certificates are assumed as trusted) -- -- This helper only check that the chain of certificate is valid, which means that each items -- received are signed by the next one, or by a system certificate. Some extra checks need to -- be done at the user level so that the certificate chain received make sense in the context. -- -- for example for HTTP, the user should typically verify the certificate subject match the URL -- of connection. -- -- TODO: verify validity, check revocation list if any, add optional user output to know -- the rejection reason. certificateVerifyChain :: [X509] -> IO Bool certificateVerifyChain l | l == [] = return False | otherwise = do -- find a matching certificate that we trust (== installed on the system) found <- SysCert.findCertificate (matchsysX509 $ head l) case found of Just sysx509 -> certificateVerifyAgainst (head l) sysx509 Nothing -> do validChain <- certificateVerifyAgainst (head l) (head $ tail l) if validChain then certificateVerifyChain $ tail l else return False where matchsysX509 (X509 cert _ _ _ _) (X509 syscert _ _ _ _) = do let x = certSubjectDN syscert let y = certIssuerDN cert x == y #endif -- | verify a certificate against another one. -- the first certificate need to be signed by the second one for this function to succeed. certificateVerifyAgainst :: X509 -> X509 -> IO Bool certificateVerifyAgainst ux509@(X509 _ _ _ sigalg sig) (X509 scert _ _ _ _) = do let f = verifyF sigalg pk case f udata esig of Right True -> return True _ -> return False where udata = B.concat $ L.toChunks $ getSigningData ux509 esig = B.pack sig pk = certPubKey scert verifyF :: SignatureALG -> PubKey -> B.ByteString -> B.ByteString -> Either String Bool -- md[245]WithRSAEncryption: -- -- pkcs-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 1 } -- rsaEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 1 } -- md2WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 2 } -- md4WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 3 } -- md5WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { pkcs-1 4 } verifyF SignatureALG_md2WithRSAEncryption (PubKeyRSA rsak) = rsaVerify MD2.hash asn1 (mkRSA rsak) where asn1 = "\x30\x20\x30\x0c\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x02\x05\x05\x00\x02\x10" verifyF SignatureALG_md5WithRSAEncryption (PubKeyRSA rsak) = rsaVerify MD5.hash asn1 (mkRSA rsak) where asn1 = "\x30\x20\x30\x0c\x06\x08\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x02\x05\x05\x00\x04\x10" verifyF SignatureALG_sha1WithRSAEncryption (PubKeyRSA rsak) = rsaVerify SHA1.hash asn1 (mkRSA rsak) where asn1 = "\x30\x21\x30\x09\x06\x05\x2b\x0e\x03\x02\x1a\x05\x00\x04\x14" verifyF SignatureALG_dsaWithSHA1 (PubKeyDSA (pub,p,q,g)) = dsaSHA1Verify pk where pk = DSA.PublicKey { DSA.public_params = (p,g,q), DSA.public_y = pub } verifyF _ _ = (\_ _ -> Left "unexpected/wrong signature") dsaSHA1Verify pk _ b = either (Left . show) (Right) $ DSA.verify asig SHA1.hash pk b where asig = (0,0) {- FIXME : need to work out how to get R/S from the bytestring a -} rsaVerify h hdesc pk a b = either (Left . show) (Right) $ RSA.verify h hdesc pk a b mkRSA (lenmodulus, modulus, e) = RSA.PublicKey { RSA.public_sz = lenmodulus, RSA.public_n = modulus, RSA.public_e = e } -- | Verify that the given certificate chain is application to the given fully qualified host name. certificateVerifyDomain :: String -> [X509] -> Bool certificateVerifyDomain _ [] = False certificateVerifyDomain fqhn (X509 cert _ _ _ _:_) = case lookup oidCommonName $ certSubjectDN cert of Nothing -> False Just (_, val) -> matchDomain (splitDot val) where matchDomain l | length (filter (== "") l) > 0 = False | head l == "*" = wildcardMatch (reverse $ drop 1 l) | otherwise = l == splitDot fqhn -- only 1 wildcard is valid, and if multiples are present -- they won't have a wildcard meaning but will be match as normal star -- character to the fqhn and inevitably will fail. wildcardMatch l -- .com or is always invalid | length l < 2 = False -- .com. is always invalid | length (head l) <= 2 && length (head $ drop 1 l) <= 3 && length l < 3 = False | otherwise = l == take (length l) (reverse $ splitDot fqhn) splitDot :: String -> [String] splitDot [] = [""] splitDot x = let (y, z) = break (== '.') x in y : (if z == "" then [] else splitDot $ drop 1 z) -- Maybe should verify whole chain certificateVerifyValidity :: Day -> [X509] -> Bool certificateVerifyValidity _ [] = False certificateVerifyValidity ctime (X509 cert _ _ _ _ :_) = let ((beforeDay,_,_) , (afterDay,_,_)) = certValidity cert in beforeDay < ctime && ctime <= afterDay certificateFingerprint :: (L.ByteString -> B.ByteString) -> X509 -> B.ByteString certificateFingerprint hash x509 = hash $ getSigningData x509