Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Type PublicKey

type PublicKey = G

Type SecretKey

type SecretKey = E

Type Hash

newtype Hash crypto c

Constructors

Hash (E crypto c)

Instances

Eq (Hash crypto c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

(==) :: Hash crypto c -> Hash crypto c -> Bool

(/=) :: Hash crypto c -> Hash crypto c -> Bool

Ord (Hash crypto c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

compare :: Hash crypto c -> Hash crypto c -> Ordering

(<) :: Hash crypto c -> Hash crypto c -> Bool

(<=) :: Hash crypto c -> Hash crypto c -> Bool

(>) :: Hash crypto c -> Hash crypto c -> Bool

(>=) :: Hash crypto c -> Hash crypto c -> Bool

max :: Hash crypto c -> Hash crypto c -> Hash crypto c

min :: Hash crypto c -> Hash crypto c -> Hash crypto c

Show (Hash crypto c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

showsPrec :: Int -> Hash crypto c -> ShowS

show :: Hash crypto c -> String

showList :: [Hash crypto c] -> ShowS

NFData (Hash crypto c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

rnf :: Hash crypto c -> ()

hash :: CryptoParams crypto c => ByteString -> [G crypto c] -> E crypto c

(hash bs gs) returns as a number in E the SHA256 hash of the given ByteString bs prefixing the decimal representation of given subgroup elements gs, with a comma (",") intercalated between them.

NOTE: to avoid any collision when the hash function is used in different contexts, a message gs is actually prefixed by a bs indicating the context.

Used by proveEncryption and verifyEncryption, where the bs usually contains the statement to be proven, and the gs contains the commitments.

decodeBigEndian :: ByteString -> Natural

(decodeBigEndian bs) interpret bs as big-endian number.

Type Base64SHA256

newtype Base64SHA256

Constructors

Base64SHA256 Text

Instances

Eq Base64SHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

(==) :: Base64SHA256 -> Base64SHA256 -> Bool

(/=) :: Base64SHA256 -> Base64SHA256 -> Bool

Ord Base64SHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

compare :: Base64SHA256 -> Base64SHA256 -> Ordering

(<) :: Base64SHA256 -> Base64SHA256 -> Bool

(<=) :: Base64SHA256 -> Base64SHA256 -> Bool

(>) :: Base64SHA256 -> Base64SHA256 -> Bool

(>=) :: Base64SHA256 -> Base64SHA256 -> Bool

max :: Base64SHA256 -> Base64SHA256 -> Base64SHA256

min :: Base64SHA256 -> Base64SHA256 -> Base64SHA256

Show Base64SHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

showsPrec :: Int -> Base64SHA256 -> ShowS

show :: Base64SHA256 -> String

showList :: [Base64SHA256] -> ShowS

Generic Base64SHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Associated Types

type Rep Base64SHA256 :: Type -> Type

Methods

from :: Base64SHA256 -> Rep Base64SHA256 x

to :: Rep Base64SHA256 x -> Base64SHA256

ToJSON Base64SHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

toJSON :: Base64SHA256 -> Value

toEncoding :: Base64SHA256 -> Encoding

toJSONList :: [Base64SHA256] -> Value

toEncodingList :: [Base64SHA256] -> Encoding

FromJSON Base64SHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

parseJSON :: Value -> Parser Base64SHA256

parseJSONList :: Value -> Parser [Base64SHA256]

NFData Base64SHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

rnf :: Base64SHA256 -> ()

type Rep Base64SHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

type Rep Base64SHA256 = D1 (MetaData "Base64SHA256" "Voting.Protocol.Cryptography" "hjugement-protocol-0.0.10.20191104-EAw7qkvTkg3AkEmPDQjrRv" True) (C1 (MetaCons "Base64SHA256" PrefixI False) (S1 (MetaSel (Nothing :: Maybe Symbol) NoSourceUnpackedness NoSourceStrictness DecidedLazy) (Rec0 Text)))

base64SHA256 :: ByteString -> Base64SHA256

(base64SHA256 bs) returns the SHA256 hash of the given ByteString bs, as a Text escaped in base64 encoding (RFC 4648).

Type HexSHA256

newtype HexSHA256

Constructors

HexSHA256 Text

Instances

Eq HexSHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

(==) :: HexSHA256 -> HexSHA256 -> Bool

(/=) :: HexSHA256 -> HexSHA256 -> Bool

Ord HexSHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

compare :: HexSHA256 -> HexSHA256 -> Ordering

(<) :: HexSHA256 -> HexSHA256 -> Bool

(<=) :: HexSHA256 -> HexSHA256 -> Bool

(>) :: HexSHA256 -> HexSHA256 -> Bool

(>=) :: HexSHA256 -> HexSHA256 -> Bool

max :: HexSHA256 -> HexSHA256 -> HexSHA256

min :: HexSHA256 -> HexSHA256 -> HexSHA256

Show HexSHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

showsPrec :: Int -> HexSHA256 -> ShowS

show :: HexSHA256 -> String

showList :: [HexSHA256] -> ShowS

Generic HexSHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Associated Types

type Rep HexSHA256 :: Type -> Type

Methods

from :: HexSHA256 -> Rep HexSHA256 x

to :: Rep HexSHA256 x -> HexSHA256

ToJSON HexSHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

toJSON :: HexSHA256 -> Value

toEncoding :: HexSHA256 -> Encoding

toJSONList :: [HexSHA256] -> Value

toEncodingList :: [HexSHA256] -> Encoding

FromJSON HexSHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

parseJSON :: Value -> Parser HexSHA256

parseJSONList :: Value -> Parser [HexSHA256]

NFData HexSHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

rnf :: HexSHA256 -> ()

type Rep HexSHA256

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

type Rep HexSHA256 = D1 (MetaData "HexSHA256" "Voting.Protocol.Cryptography" "hjugement-protocol-0.0.10.20191104-EAw7qkvTkg3AkEmPDQjrRv" True) (C1 (MetaCons "HexSHA256" PrefixI False) (S1 (MetaSel (Nothing :: Maybe Symbol) NoSourceUnpackedness NoSourceStrictness DecidedLazy) (Rec0 Text)))

hexSHA256 :: ByteString -> Text

(hexSHA256 bs) returns the SHA256 hash of the given ByteString bs, escaped in hexadecimal into a Text of 32 lowercase characters.

Used (in retro-dependencies of this library) to hash the PublicKey of a voter or a trustee.

Random

randomR :: Monad m => RandomGen r => Random i => Ring i => i -> StateT r m i

(randomR i) returns a random integer in [0..i-1].

random :: Monad m => RandomGen r => Random i => Bounded i => StateT r m i

(random) returns a random integer in the range determined by its type.

Type Encryption

data Encryption crypto v c

ElGamal-like encryption. Its security relies on the Discrete Logarithm problem.

Because (groupGen ^encNonce ^secKey == groupGen ^secKey ^encNonce), knowing secKey, one can divide encryption_vault by (encryption_nonce ^secKey) to decipher (groupGen ^clear), then the clear text must be small to be decryptable, because it is encrypted as a power of groupGen (hence the "-like" in "ElGamal-like") to enable the additive homomorphism.

NOTE: Since (encryption_vault * encryption_nonce == encryption_nonce ^ (secKey + clear)), then: (logBase encryption_nonce (encryption_vault * encryption_nonce) == secKey + clear).

Constructors

Encryption

Fields

• encryption_nonce :: !(G crypto c)

  Public part of the randomness encNonce used to encrypt the clear text, equal to (groupGen ^encNonce)

• encryption_vault :: !(G crypto c)

  Encrypted clear text, equal to (pubKey ^encNone * groupGen ^clear)

Instances

Eq (G crypto c) => Eq (Encryption crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

(==) :: Encryption crypto v c -> Encryption crypto v c -> Bool

(/=) :: Encryption crypto v c -> Encryption crypto v c -> Bool

(Show (G crypto c), Show (G crypto c)) => Show (Encryption crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

showsPrec :: Int -> Encryption crypto v c -> ShowS

show :: Encryption crypto v c -> String

showList :: [Encryption crypto v c] -> ShowS

Generic (Encryption crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Associated Types

type Rep (Encryption crypto v c) :: Type -> Type

Methods

from :: Encryption crypto v c -> Rep (Encryption crypto v c) x

to :: Rep (Encryption crypto v c) x -> Encryption crypto v c

(Reifies v Version, CryptoParams crypto c) => ToJSON (Encryption crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

toJSON :: Encryption crypto v c -> Value

toEncoding :: Encryption crypto v c -> Encoding

toJSONList :: [Encryption crypto v c] -> Value

toEncodingList :: [Encryption crypto v c] -> Encoding

(Reifies v Version, CryptoParams crypto c) => FromJSON (Encryption crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

parseJSON :: Value -> Parser (Encryption crypto v c)

parseJSONList :: Value -> Parser [Encryption crypto v c]

NFData (G crypto c) => NFData (Encryption crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

rnf :: Encryption crypto v c -> ()

CryptoParams crypto c => Additive (Encryption crypto v c)

Additive homomorphism. Using the fact that: groupGen ^x * groupGen ^y == groupGen ^(x+y).

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

zero :: Encryption crypto v c

(+) :: Encryption crypto v c -> Encryption crypto v c -> Encryption crypto v c

sum :: Foldable f => f (Encryption crypto v c) -> Encryption crypto v c

type Rep (Encryption crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

type Rep (Encryption crypto v c) = D1 (MetaData "Encryption" "Voting.Protocol.Cryptography" "hjugement-protocol-0.0.10.20191104-EAw7qkvTkg3AkEmPDQjrRv" False) (C1 (MetaCons "Encryption" PrefixI True) (S1 (MetaSel (Just "encryption_nonce") NoSourceUnpackedness SourceStrict DecidedStrict) (Rec0 (G crypto c)) :*: S1 (MetaSel (Just "encryption_vault") NoSourceUnpackedness SourceStrict DecidedStrict) (Rec0 (G crypto c))))

Type EncryptionNonce

type EncryptionNonce = E

encrypt :: Reifies v Version => CryptoParams crypto c => Monad m => RandomGen r => PublicKey crypto c -> E crypto c -> StateT r m (EncryptionNonce crypto c, Encryption crypto v c)

(encrypt pubKey clear) returns an ElGamal-like Encryption.

WARNING: the secret encryption nonce (encNonce) is returned alongside the Encryption in order to prove the validity of the encrypted clear text in proveEncryption, but this secret encNonce MUST be forgotten after that, as it may be used to decipher the Encryption without the SecretKey associated with pubKey.

Type Proof

data Proof crypto v c

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm: (secret == logBase base (base^secret)).

Constructors

Proof

Fields

• proof_challenge :: !(Challenge crypto c)

  Challenge sent by the verifier to the prover to ensure that the prover really has knowledge of the secret and is not replaying. Actually, proof_challenge is not sent to the prover, but derived from the prover's Commitments and statements with a collision resistant hash. Hence the prover cannot chose the proof_challenge to his/her liking.

• proof_response :: !(E crypto c)

  A discrete logarithm sent by the prover to the verifier, as a response to proof_challenge.

  If the verifier observes that (proof_challenge == hash statement [commitment]), where:

  • statement is a serialization of a tag, base and basePowSec,
  • commitment == commit proof base basePowSec == base ^ proof_response * basePowSec ^ proof_challenge,
  • and basePowSec == base^sec,

  then, with overwhelming probability (due to the hash function), the prover was not able to choose proof_challenge yet was able to compute a proof_response such that (commitment == base ^ proof_response * basePowSec ^ proof_challenge), that is to say: (proof_response == logBase base commitment - sec * proof_challenge), therefore the prover knows sec.

  The prover choses commitment to be a random power of base, to ensure that each prove does not reveal any information about its secret.

Instances

Eq (Proof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

(==) :: Proof crypto v c -> Proof crypto v c -> Bool

(/=) :: Proof crypto v c -> Proof crypto v c -> Bool

Show (Proof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

showsPrec :: Int -> Proof crypto v c -> ShowS

show :: Proof crypto v c -> String

showList :: [Proof crypto v c] -> ShowS

Generic (Proof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Associated Types

type Rep (Proof crypto v c) :: Type -> Type

Methods

from :: Proof crypto v c -> Rep (Proof crypto v c) x

to :: Rep (Proof crypto v c) x -> Proof crypto v c

Reifies v Version => ToJSON (Proof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

toJSON :: Proof crypto v c -> Value

toEncoding :: Proof crypto v c -> Encoding

toJSONList :: [Proof crypto v c] -> Value

toEncodingList :: [Proof crypto v c] -> Encoding

(CryptoParams crypto c, Reifies v Version) => FromJSON (Proof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

parseJSON :: Value -> Parser (Proof crypto v c)

parseJSONList :: Value -> Parser [Proof crypto v c]

NFData (Proof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

rnf :: Proof crypto v c -> ()

type Rep (Proof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

type Rep (Proof crypto v c) = D1 (MetaData "Proof" "Voting.Protocol.Cryptography" "hjugement-protocol-0.0.10.20191104-EAw7qkvTkg3AkEmPDQjrRv" False) (C1 (MetaCons "Proof" PrefixI True) (S1 (MetaSel (Just "proof_challenge") NoSourceUnpackedness SourceStrict DecidedStrict) (Rec0 (Challenge crypto c)) :*: S1 (MetaSel (Just "proof_response") NoSourceUnpackedness SourceStrict DecidedStrict) (Rec0 (E crypto c))))

Type ZKP

newtype ZKP

Zero-knowledge proof.

A protocol is zero-knowledge if the verifier learns nothing from the protocol except that the prover knows the secret.

DOC: Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway. Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for designing efficient protocols. In ACM-CCS’93, 1993.

Constructors

ZKP ByteString

Type Challenge

type Challenge = E

Type Oracle

type Oracle list crypto c = list (Commitment crypto c) -> Challenge crypto c

prove :: forall crypto v c list m r. Reifies v Version => CryptoParams crypto c => Monad m => RandomGen r => Functor list => E crypto c -> list (G crypto c) -> Oracle list crypto c -> StateT r m (Proof crypto v c)

(prove sec commitmentBases oracle) returns a Proof that sec is known (by proving the knowledge of its discrete logarithm).

The Oracle is given Commitments equal to the commitmentBases raised to the power of the secret nonce of the Proof, as those are the Commitments that the verifier will obtain when composing the proof_challenge and proof_response together (with commit).

WARNING: for prove to be a so-called strong Fiat-Shamir transformation (not a weak): the statement must be included in the hash (along with the commitments).

NOTE: a random nonce is used to ensure each prove does not reveal any information regarding the secret sec, because two Proofs using the same Commitment can be used to deduce sec (using the special-soundness).

proveQuicker :: Reifies v Version => CryptoParams crypto c => Monad m => RandomGen r => Functor list => E crypto c -> list (G crypto c) -> Oracle list crypto c -> StateT r m (Proof crypto v c)

Like prove but quicker. It chould replace prove entirely when Helios-C specifications will be fixed.

fakeProof :: CryptoParams crypto c => Monad m => RandomGen r => StateT r m (Proof crypto v c)

(fakeProof) returns a Proof whose proof_challenge and proof_response are uniformly chosen at random, instead of (proof_challenge == hash statement commitments) and (proof_response == nonce + sec * proof_challenge) as a Proof returned by prove.

Used in proveEncryption to fill the returned DisjProof with fake Proofs for all Disjunctions but the encrypted one.

Type Commitment

type Commitment = G

A commitment from the prover to the verifier. It's a power of groupGen chosen randomly by the prover when making a Proof with prove.

commit :: forall crypto v c. Reifies v Version => CryptoParams crypto c => Proof crypto v c -> G crypto c -> G crypto c -> Commitment crypto c

(commit proof base basePowSec) returns a Commitment from the given Proof with the knowledge of the verifier.

commitQuicker :: CryptoParams crypto c => Proof crypto v c -> G crypto c -> G crypto c -> Commitment crypto c

Like commit but quicker. It chould replace commit entirely when Helios-C specifications will be fixed.

Type Disjunction

type Disjunction = G

A Disjunction is an inversed (groupGen ^opinion) it's used in proveEncryption to generate a Proof that an encryption_vault contains a given (groupGen ^opinion),

booleanDisjunctions :: forall crypto c. CryptoParams crypto c => [Disjunction crypto c]

intervalDisjunctions :: forall crypto c. CryptoParams crypto c => Natural -> Natural -> [Disjunction crypto c]

Type DisjProof

newtype DisjProof crypto v c

A list of Proofs to prove that the opinion within an Encryption is indexing a Disjunction within a list of them, without revealing which opinion it is.

Constructors

DisjProof [Proof crypto v c]

Instances

Eq (DisjProof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

(==) :: DisjProof crypto v c -> DisjProof crypto v c -> Bool

(/=) :: DisjProof crypto v c -> DisjProof crypto v c -> Bool

Show (DisjProof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

showsPrec :: Int -> DisjProof crypto v c -> ShowS

show :: DisjProof crypto v c -> String

showList :: [DisjProof crypto v c] -> ShowS

Generic (DisjProof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Associated Types

type Rep (DisjProof crypto v c) :: Type -> Type

Methods

from :: DisjProof crypto v c -> Rep (DisjProof crypto v c) x

to :: Rep (DisjProof crypto v c) x -> DisjProof crypto v c

Reifies v Version => ToJSON (DisjProof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

toJSON :: DisjProof crypto v c -> Value

toEncoding :: DisjProof crypto v c -> Encoding

toJSONList :: [DisjProof crypto v c] -> Value

toEncodingList :: [DisjProof crypto v c] -> Encoding

(Reifies v Version, CryptoParams crypto c) => FromJSON (DisjProof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

parseJSON :: Value -> Parser (DisjProof crypto v c)

parseJSONList :: Value -> Parser [DisjProof crypto v c]

NFData (DisjProof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

rnf :: DisjProof crypto v c -> ()

type Rep (DisjProof crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

type Rep (DisjProof crypto v c) = D1 (MetaData "DisjProof" "Voting.Protocol.Cryptography" "hjugement-protocol-0.0.10.20191104-EAw7qkvTkg3AkEmPDQjrRv" True) (C1 (MetaCons "DisjProof" PrefixI False) (S1 (MetaSel (Nothing :: Maybe Symbol) NoSourceUnpackedness NoSourceStrictness DecidedLazy) (Rec0 [Proof crypto v c])))

proveEncryption :: Reifies v Version => CryptoParams crypto c => Monad m => RandomGen r => PublicKey crypto c -> ZKP -> ([Disjunction crypto c], [Disjunction crypto c]) -> (EncryptionNonce crypto c, Encryption crypto v c) -> StateT r m (DisjProof crypto v c)

(proveEncryption elecPubKey voterZKP (prevDisjs,nextDisjs) (encNonce,enc)) returns a DisjProof that enc encrypts the Disjunction d between prevDisjs and nextDisjs.

The prover proves that it knows an encNonce, such that: (enc == Encryption{encryption_nonce=groupGen ^encNonce, encryption_vault=elecPubKey^encNonce * groupGen^d})

A NIZK Disjunctive Chaum Pedersen Logarithm Equality is used.

DOC: Pierrick Gaudry. Some ZK security proofs for Belenios, 2017.

verifyEncryption :: Reifies v Version => CryptoParams crypto c => Monad m => PublicKey crypto c -> ZKP -> [Disjunction crypto c] -> (Encryption crypto v c, DisjProof crypto v c) -> ExceptT ErrorVerifyEncryption m Bool

Hashing

encryptionStatement :: CryptoParams crypto c => ZKP -> Encryption crypto v c -> ByteString

encryptionCommitments :: Reifies v Version => CryptoParams crypto c => PublicKey crypto c -> Encryption crypto v c -> Disjunction crypto c -> Proof crypto v c -> [G crypto c]

(encryptionCommitments elecPubKey enc disj proof) returns the Commitments with only the knowledge of the verifier.

For the prover the Proof comes from fakeProof, and for the verifier the Proof comes from the prover.

Type ErrorVerifyEncryption

data ErrorVerifyEncryption

Error raised by verifyEncryption.

Constructors

ErrorVerifyEncryption_InvalidProofLength Natural Natural

When the number of proofs is different than the number of Disjunctions.

Instances

Eq ErrorVerifyEncryption

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

(==) :: ErrorVerifyEncryption -> ErrorVerifyEncryption -> Bool

(/=) :: ErrorVerifyEncryption -> ErrorVerifyEncryption -> Bool

Show ErrorVerifyEncryption

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

showsPrec :: Int -> ErrorVerifyEncryption -> ShowS

show :: ErrorVerifyEncryption -> String

showList :: [ErrorVerifyEncryption] -> ShowS

Type Signature

data Signature crypto v c

Schnorr-like signature.

Used by each voter to sign his/her encrypted Ballot using his/her Credential, in order to avoid ballot stuffing.

Constructors

Signature

Fields

• signature_publicKey :: !(PublicKey crypto c)

  Verification key.

• signature_proof :: !(Proof crypto v c)

Instances

Generic (Signature crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Associated Types

type Rep (Signature crypto v c) :: Type -> Type

Methods

from :: Signature crypto v c -> Rep (Signature crypto v c) x

to :: Rep (Signature crypto v c) x -> Signature crypto v c

(Reifies v Version, CryptoParams crypto c) => ToJSON (Signature crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

toJSON :: Signature crypto v c -> Value

toEncoding :: Signature crypto v c -> Encoding

toJSONList :: [Signature crypto v c] -> Value

toEncodingList :: [Signature crypto v c] -> Encoding

(Reifies v Version, CryptoParams crypto c) => FromJSON (Signature crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

parseJSON :: Value -> Parser (Signature crypto v c)

parseJSONList :: Value -> Parser [Signature crypto v c]

(NFData crypto, NFData (G crypto c)) => NFData (Signature crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

Methods

rnf :: Signature crypto v c -> ()

type Rep (Signature crypto v c)

Defined in Voting.Protocol.Cryptography

type Rep (Signature crypto v c) = D1 (MetaData "Signature" "Voting.Protocol.Cryptography" "hjugement-protocol-0.0.10.20191104-EAw7qkvTkg3AkEmPDQjrRv" False) (C1 (MetaCons "Signature" PrefixI True) (S1 (MetaSel (Just "signature_publicKey") NoSourceUnpackedness SourceStrict DecidedStrict) (Rec0 (PublicKey crypto c)) :*: S1 (MetaSel (Just "signature_proof") NoSourceUnpackedness SourceStrict DecidedStrict) (Rec0 (Proof crypto v c))))