Safe Haskell	None
Language	Haskell2010

Voting.Protocol.Trustee.Indispensable

Contents

Type TrusteePublicKey
Election's PublicKey

Synopsis

data TrusteePublicKey crypto v c = TrusteePublicKey {
- trustee_PublicKey :: !(PublicKey crypto c)
- trustee_SecretKeyProof :: !(Proof crypto v c)
}
proveIndispensableTrusteePublicKey :: Reifies v Version => GroupParams crypto c => Key crypto => Monad m => RandomGen r => SecretKey crypto c -> StateT r m (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c)
verifyIndispensableTrusteePublicKey :: Reifies v Version => GroupParams crypto c => Monad m => TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> ExceptT ErrorTrusteePublicKey m ()
data ErrorTrusteePublicKey = ErrorTrusteePublicKey_WrongProof
indispensableTrusteePublicKeyStatement :: GroupParams crypto c => PublicKey crypto c -> ByteString
combineIndispensableTrusteePublicKeys :: GroupParams crypto c => [TrusteePublicKey crypto v c] -> PublicKey crypto c
verifyIndispensableDecryptionShareByTrustee :: Reifies v Version => GroupParams crypto c => Monad m => EncryptedTally crypto v c -> [PublicKey crypto c] -> [DecryptionShare crypto v c] -> ExceptT ErrorTally m ()
combineIndispensableDecryptionShares :: Reifies v Version => GroupParams crypto c => [PublicKey crypto c] -> DecryptionShareCombinator crypto v c

Type `TrusteePublicKey`

data TrusteePublicKey crypto v c Source #

Constructors

TrusteePublicKey

Fields

trustee_PublicKey :: !(PublicKey crypto c)
trustee_SecretKeyProof :: !(Proof crypto v c)
NOTE: It is important to ensure that each trustee generates its key pair independently of the PublicKeys published by the other trustees. Otherwise, a dishonest trustee could publish as PublicKey its genuine PublicKey divided by the PublicKeys of the other trustees. This would then lead to the election_PublicKey being equal to this dishonest trustee's PublicKey, which means that knowing its SecretKey would be sufficient for decrypting messages encrypted to the election_PublicKey. To avoid this attack, each trustee publishing a PublicKey must prove knowledge of the corresponding SecretKey. Which is done in proveIndispensableTrusteePublicKey and verifyIndispensableTrusteePublicKey.

Instances

Eq (G crypto c) => Eq (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) Source #
Instance details Defined in Voting.Protocol.Trustee.Indispensable Methods (==) :: TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> Bool # (/=) :: TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> Bool #
(Show (G crypto c), Show (PublicKey crypto c)) => Show (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) Source #
Instance details Defined in Voting.Protocol.Trustee.Indispensable Methods showsPrec :: Int -> TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> ShowS # show :: TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> String # showList :: [TrusteePublicKey crypto v c] -> ShowS #
Generic (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) Source #
Instance details Defined in Voting.Protocol.Trustee.Indispensable Associated Types type Rep (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) :: Type -> Type # Methods from :: TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> Rep (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) x # to :: Rep (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) x -> TrusteePublicKey crypto v c #
ToJSON (G crypto c) => ToJSON (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) Source #
Instance details Defined in Voting.Protocol.Trustee.Indispensable Methods toJSON :: TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> Value # toEncoding :: TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> Encoding # toJSONList :: [TrusteePublicKey crypto v c] -> Value # toEncodingList :: [TrusteePublicKey crypto v c] -> Encoding #
GroupParams crypto c => FromJSON (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) Source #
Instance details Defined in Voting.Protocol.Trustee.Indispensable Methods parseJSON :: Value -> Parser (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) # parseJSONList :: Value -> Parser [TrusteePublicKey crypto v c] #
NFData (G crypto c) => NFData (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) Source #
Instance details Defined in Voting.Protocol.Trustee.Indispensable Methods rnf :: TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> () #
type Rep (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) Source #
Instance details Defined in Voting.Protocol.Trustee.Indispensable type Rep (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) = D1 (MetaData "TrusteePublicKey" "Voting.Protocol.Trustee.Indispensable" "hjugement-protocol-0.0.9.20191031-G4czrbu2qOeHMRyb9R422Q" False) (C1 (MetaCons "TrusteePublicKey" PrefixI True) (S1 (MetaSel (Just "trustee_PublicKey") NoSourceUnpackedness SourceStrict DecidedStrict) (Rec0 (PublicKey crypto c)) :*: S1 (MetaSel (Just "trustee_SecretKeyProof") NoSourceUnpackedness SourceStrict DecidedStrict) (Rec0 (Proof crypto v c))))

Generating a `TrusteePublicKey`

proveIndispensableTrusteePublicKey :: Reifies v Version => GroupParams crypto c => Key crypto => Monad m => RandomGen r => SecretKey crypto c -> StateT r m (TrusteePublicKey crypto v c) Source #

(proveIndispensableTrusteePublicKey trustSecKey) returns the PublicKey associated to trustSecKey and a Proof of its knowledge.

Checking a `TrusteePublicKey` before incorporating it into the `Election'`s `PublicKey`

verifyIndispensableTrusteePublicKey :: Reifies v Version => GroupParams crypto c => Monad m => TrusteePublicKey crypto v c -> ExceptT ErrorTrusteePublicKey m () Source #

(verifyIndispensableTrusteePublicKey trustPubKey) returns True iif. the given trustee_SecretKeyProof does prove that the SecretKey associated with the given trustee_PublicKey is known by the trustee.

Type `ErrorTrusteePublicKey`

data ErrorTrusteePublicKey Source #

Constructors

ErrorTrusteePublicKey_WrongProof

The trustee_SecretKeyProof is wrong.

Instances

Eq ErrorTrusteePublicKey Source #
Instance details Defined in Voting.Protocol.Trustee.Indispensable Methods (==) :: ErrorTrusteePublicKey -> ErrorTrusteePublicKey -> Bool # (/=) :: ErrorTrusteePublicKey -> ErrorTrusteePublicKey -> Bool #
Show ErrorTrusteePublicKey Source #
Instance details Defined in Voting.Protocol.Trustee.Indispensable Methods showsPrec :: Int -> ErrorTrusteePublicKey -> ShowS # show :: ErrorTrusteePublicKey -> String # showList :: [ErrorTrusteePublicKey] -> ShowS #