The jose package

[Tags:apache, library, program, test]

An implementation of the Javascript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) and JSON Web Token (JWT; RFC 7519) formats.

The JSON Web Signature (JWS; RFC 7515) implementation is complete. JSON Web Encryption (JWE; RFC 7516) is not yet implemented.

All JWS algorithms (HMAC, ECDSA, RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS) are implemented, however, the ECDSA implementation is is vulnerable to timing attacks and should therefore only be used for JWS verification.

The Crypto.JOSE.Legacy module is provided for working with the Mozilla Persona (formerly BrowserID) key format. Only RSA keys are supported - DSA keys cannot be used and must be handled as opaque objects.

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Dependencies aeson (>=, attoparsec, base (==4.*), base64-bytestring (==1.0.*), bifunctors (>=4.0), byteable (==0.1.*), bytestring (==0.10.*), containers (>=0.5), cryptonite (>=0.7), jose, lens (>=4.3), memory (>=0.7), monad-time (>=0.1), mtl (>=2), network-uri (>=2.6), QuickCheck (>=2), quickcheck-instances, safe (>=0.3), semigroups (>=0.15), template-haskell (>=2.4), text (>=1.1), time (>=1.5), unordered-containers (==0.2.*), vector, x509 (>=1.4) [details]
License Apache-2.0
Copyright Copyright (C) 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016 Fraser Tweedale
Author Fraser Tweedale
Stability Unknown
Category Cryptography
Home page
Bug tracker
Source repository head: git clone
Uploaded Sat Dec 17 23:59:46 UTC 2016 by frasertweedale
Distributions LTSHaskell:, NixOS:, Stackage:, Tumbleweed:
Downloads 1920 total (26 in the last 30 days)
0 []
Status Docs available [build log]
Last success reported on 2016-12-18 [all 1 reports]




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Readme for jose

Readme for jose-

jose - Javascript Object Signing and Encryption & JWT (JSON Web Token)

jose is a Haskell implementation of Javascript Object Signing and Encryption and JSON Web Token.

Encryption (JWE) is not supported but signing is supported. All key types and algorithms are supported, however, EC signing is currently vulnerable to timing attacks therefore its use is strongly discouraged (EC validation is safe).

Contributions are welcome.